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RIGHTS, RIGHTS OF ACTION, AND REMEDIES: AN
INTEGRATED APPROACH
Donald H. Zeigler*
Abstract: Traditionally, courts equated rights and remedies. Consequently, courts sought to
provide remedies for the violation of statutory rights even if a statute did not contain detailed
enforcement provisions. In the 1970s, however, the U.S. Supreme Court transformed what
had been a unified inquiry into whether a statutory provision should bejudicially enforceable
into three distinct questions and developed separate criteria for deciding whether a statute
should be read to create a right, imply a right of action, or provide a remedy. Rights, rights of
action, and remedies are inextricably related. The Court's attempt to separate these
inseparable concepts has led to considerable confusion because decisions focusing on only
one part of the equation fail to acknowledge the impact on other parts. Sometimes the Court
disguises or actually misstates what it is doing. The Court has been wrong to divide rights,
rights of action, and remedies and to develop separate tests to assess each of them. While a
return to the traditional standards is impractical, the Court should integrate the separate tests
and adopt a single test to answer what is actually a single inquiry: Does the applicable
statutory provision entitle the plaintiff to the remedy he or she seeks? In answering that
question, the Court should carefully examine statutory language, the overall statutory context,
and possible reasons for caution in granting a remedy.
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INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, courts equated legal rights and remedies. A right
without a remedy was said to be "a monstrous absurdity."' Consequently,
whenever a right existed, courts strove to provide an appropriate remedy
for its violation. Courts frequently applied this standard in actions to
enforce a statute.2 Because legislatures often enacted statutes creating
rights and duties without detailed enforcement provisions, courts filled
the void. Moreover, they did so without conducting an independent
inquiry into whether the statute provided a right of action. Violation of
the right alone required a remedy
1. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838).
2. See infra Part I.A.
3. This Article defines a legal right in Hohfeldian terms. A legal right is one that imposes a
correlative duty on another to act or refrain from acting for the benefit of the person holding the
right. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning,
in FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL
ESSAYS 35-38 (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919). In this context, a right of action, or cause of action, is
the right "to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by another's violation of a legal requirement."
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.1 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). A remedy is the relief
a court grants, such as damages or an injunction. These definitions are discussed in detail infra Part
II.
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Although these principles did not guarantee effective redress in all
cases,4 they remained the governing principles in the federal courts until
the 1970s. Then, quite abruptly, the U.S. Supreme Court divided what
previously had been a single, unified inquiry into whether a statutory
provision should be judicially enforceable into three separate questions.
The Court announced that rights, rights of action, and remedies are
"analytically distinct"5 and developed separate criteria to decide whether
a statute should be read to create a right, imply a right of action, or
provide a remedy.6
The Court's trifurcated approach has caused several problems.
Decisions that focus only on a right, a right of action, or a remedy are
necessarily incomplete. Rights, rights of action, and remedies are
inextricably related; one cannot make a decision about one of them
without necessarily affecting the other two. The Court's attempt to
separate these inseparable concepts causes confusion. It also has led the
Court to disguise and even misstate what it is doing.
This Article contends that the Court is wrong to divide rights, rights
of action, and remedies and to use different tests to assess each of them.
It further argues that one integrated test should be adopted to answer
what is actually a single inquiry: Does the applicable statutory provision
entitle a plaintiff to the remedy he or she seeks? Deciding what the test
should be and how it should be applied is not a simple matter. How one
4. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
5. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,239 (1979).
6. See infra Part I.B. While many scholars criticized the criteria developed for each inquiry, most
implicitly accepted the new three-part framework. For particularly thoughtful discussions of the
implied right of action cases, see generally Robert HA. Ashford, Implied Causes ofAction Under
Federal Laws: Calling the Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984); H. Miles Foy, III,
Some Reflections on Legislation, Adjudication, and Implied Private Actions in the State and Federal
Courts, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 501 (1986); Tamar Frankel, Implied Rights ofAction, 67 VA. L. REV.
553 (1981); Thomas L. Hazen, Implied Private Remedies Under Federal Statutes: Neither a Death
Knell Nor a Moratorium-Civil Rights, Securities Regulation, and Beyond, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1333
(1980); Susan J. Stabile, The Role of Congressional Intent in Determining the Existence ofImplied
Private Rights of Action, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 861 (1996); Richard B. Stewart & Cass R.
Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1193 (1982); see also Donald H.
Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal
Courts, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 665 (1987).
For excellent discussions of the cases that develop the test to determine whether a federal statutory
provision confers an enforceable right, see George D. Brown, Whither Thiboutot? Section 1983,
Private Enforcement, and the Damages Dilemma, 33 DEPAUL L. REV. 31 (1983); Michael A.
Mazzuchi, Section 1983 and Implied Rights ofAction: Rights, Remedies, and Realism, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1062 (1992); Henry Paul Monoghan, Federal Statutory Review Under Section 1983 and the
APA, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 233 (1991); Richard B. Stewart, Federalism and Rights, 19 GA. L. REV.
917 (1985); and Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement ofFederalLaw, 49 U.
CHi. L. REV. 394 (1982).
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answers these questions depends on one's views about underlying issues
of federalism and separation of powers, and on several pragmatic
concerns. To help lay the groundwork for a possible consensus, this
Article presents two models governing the judicial enforcement of
federal statutes denoted the "cooperative model" and the "adversarial
model."7 In formulating a new standard, it attempts to incorporate the
generous and constructive aspects of the cooperative model and the
cautionary concerns of the adversarial model.
This Article has three parts. Part I traces the development and
application of the traditional standards equating rights and remedies from
early English cases through U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the late
1960s. Part I then discusses the Court's separation of rights, rights of
action, and remedies in the 1970s. Finally, it reviews the Court's
development of separate criteria for deciding whether a statute should be
read to confer a right, imply a cause of action, or provide a remedy.
Part II begins by making the case for the development of a single,
integrated test to decide whether the statutory provision on which
plaintiff relies entitles the plaintiff to the remedy he or she seeks. It
explains why rights, rights of action, and remedies are inextricably
related. Part II next explores the problems caused by the Court's attempt
to separate the inseparable. Part II then describes the two models
governing judicial enforcement of federal statutes.
Part III proposes a new standard that seeks to find a middle ground
between the two models. The test, which is an analytic process rather
than a set of factors or criteria, begins with a careful look at the statutory
language on which a plaintiff relies, examines the provision in its overall
statutory context, and considers possible reasons for caution in granting a
plaintiff the remedy sought.
The new test would lead to more honest court opinions that
acknowledge the full interrelation of rights, rights of action, and
remedies. Use of the test would change the results of some U.S. Supreme
Court decisions. The biggest change would occur in implied right of
action cases because the proposed test replaces the current single-factor
test used in those cases' with a broader, many-faceted standard. In the
7. The terms "cooperative" and "adversarial" refer to the relationship between the federal courts
and Congress. The basic premise of the cooperative model is that federal courts should play a
constructive, supportive role in interpreting and implementing federal legislation. The basic premise
of the adversarial model is that federal courts should play a limited role in these endeavors, shifting
most of the responsibility to Congress. See infra Part II.B.
8. The Court purports to consider "solely .. .whether Congress intended to create the private right
of action asserted" by the plaintiff. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979)
(emphasis added).
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course of explaining the proposed test, Part I discusses cases that might
be decided differently under the new standard.
I. THE TRADITIONAL STANDARDS AND THEIR DEMISE
A. The Traditional Standards
The principle that rights must have remedies is ancient and
venerable, and played an important role in English and American legal
history. The principle underlies the rise of equity,9 the merger of law and
equity,'" and the corresponding development of new codes of
procedure." The principle also provided the impetus for actions to
redress violations of statutory rights.' 2
Early English and American cases enforcing statutes equated rights
and remedies. 3 As Professor H. Miles Foy states: "The essential
notion.., was that persons suffering legal wrongs were entitled to
judicial remedies. What is more, they were entitled to adequate
9. Chancery courts developed because common law courts often did not provide complete and
effective redress of legal wrongs. See GEORGE T. BISPHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY: A
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF JUSTICE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF CHANCERY 9 (9th ed. 1915); 1
WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 398 (7th ed. 1956). Equity courts enabled
the English legal system to provide more complete relief. See 1 JOHN N. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 20-21 (5th ed. 1941) ("[Ihe common law furnished a very meager system
of remedies, utterly insufficient for the needs of a civilization advancing beyond the domination of
feudal ideas."). It became a maxim of equity jurisprudence that "equity will not suffer a right to be
without a remedy." BISPHAM, supra, at 56; see generally Zeigler, supra note 6, at 667-69.
10. Law and equity were merged so that legal rights could be better enforced. Zeigler, supra note
6, at 669. In both England and America, the existence of two separate judicial systems caused
confusion and inconvenience. See Roscoe Pound, The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. REV. 20,
23 (1905); Edward R. Taylor, The Fusion ofLaw and Equity, 66 U. PA. L. REV. 17,23 (1917). With
the merger of law and equity, litigants could obtain both legal and equitable relief in one lawsuit. See
William F. Walsh, Merger of Law and Equity Under Codes and Other Statutes, 6 N.Y.U. L. REV.
157, 169 (1929).
11. State legislatures promulgated new codes ofcivil procedure to better ensure the vindication of
rights. See CHARLES M. HEPBURN, THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CODE PLEADING IN
AMERICA AND ENGLAND 21 (1897) ("[The code movement's] one great purpose was to bring
procedure into a simple and natural relation with substantive law... [and] to give a natural and
vigorous vitality to a maxim which the law had long placed before itself as the ideal-wherever a
right, there a remedy.").
12. Actions on statutes probably have their origin in the early English Statute of Westminster II,
which authorized an action on the case for those injured by breach of a statutory duty. The statute
read: "Moreover, concerning the Statutes provided where the Law faileth, and for Remedies, lest
Suitors coming to the King's Court should depart from thence without Remedy, they shall have
Writs provided in their Cases... :'Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw., ch. 50, § 2 (Eng.).
13. See Foy, supra note 6, at 526-32.
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remedies."' 4 Of course, this ideal was not always realized in practice. 5
As Professors Richard H. Fallon and Daniel J. Meltzer point out, "the
structure of substantive, jurisdictional, and remedial doctrines that
existed [in the eighteenth century] and that evolved through the
nineteenth century by no means guaranteed effective redress for all
invasions of legally protected rights and interests."' 6 Nonetheless, people
in those times believed that rights required remedies. In Justice Harlan's
words, "contemporary modes of jurisprudential thought... appeared to
link 'rights' and 'remedies' in a 1:1 correlation."' 7
In addition, when courts enforced rights in statutes that did not
contain express remedies, they did not say that they were creating or
implying a "cause of action" or a "private right of action" from the
statute. The absence of such statements suggests that in this context 8
courts did not view a cause of action as a separate procedural entity,
independent of a right and remedy, that had to be present for an action to
go forward. Thus, modem references to early English and American
cases as "implied right of action" cases may mischaracterize what the
courts were doing." Some early opinions suggested that an action on the
case could be used to enforce a statutory right,20 and perhaps the form of
action provided something roughly analogous to what we would today
call a cause of action. But early cases plainly did not inquire whether the
statute at issue provided a separate cause of action or make a separate
14. Id. at 529.
15. As Professor Paul Gewirtz notes, the law of remedies is by nature a 'Jurisprudence of
deficiency, of what is lost between declaring a right and implementing a remedy." Paul Gewirtz,
Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 587 (1983).
16. Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional
Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REv. 1731, 1780 (1991). The authors note that common law privileges
stood as barriers to full relief and that remedies were very limited in suits against the government
and government officials. Id. at 1780-81.
17. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 401
n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. As Justice Cardozo once remarked, "[a) 'cause of action' may mean one thing for one purpose
and something different for another." United States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-68
(1933).
19. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299-300 & n.3 (1981) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (stating that "implication of private causes of action was a well-known practice at
common law and in American courts" and citing early English treatises and cases); Stewart &
Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1206 & n.39 (stating that "[a]t common law, courts created private rights
of action ... by creating an action in damages for statutory wrongs" and citing early English treaties
and cases); Patrick B. Fazzone, Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation:
Harmonization Within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 DuKE L.J. 928,929 n.2 ("The doctrine of implied
rights of action has been traced to an English case, Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193 (K.B.
1854).').
20. See, e.g., Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. 1193, 1196 (K.B. 1854), discussed at infra note 23.
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decision whether to create or deny a private right of action. Violation of
the right alone required a remedy.
Ashby v. White2' provides an example of courts equating rights and
remedies without mention of a cause of action. The plaintiff claimed an
official had improperly denied him the right to vote in an election and
sought damages.' Chief Justice Holt cited an ancient statute conferring
that right and concluded the plaintiff should have a remedy even though
the statute did not provide one:
If the plaintiff has a right, he must of necessity have a means to
vindicate and maintain it, and a remedy if he is injured in the
exercise or enjoyment of it; and indeed it is a vain thing to imagine
a right without a remedy; for.., want of right and want of remedy
are reciprocal.... Where a man has but one remedy to come at his
right, if he loses that he loses his right.'
Early American cases also equated rights and remedies and did not
identify a cause of action as a separate requirement for relief.- Marbury
21. 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703).
22. Id. at 134.
23. Id. at 136 (Holt, CJ., dissenting). Originally, the majority decided for the defendant. See id. at
129-33. Subsequently, however, Chief Justice Holt's dissenting opinion was accepted by the House
of Lords and judgment was entered for the plaintiff. Id. at 138.
The often-cited case of Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng. Rep. I 193"(K.B. 1854), also equates rights and
remedies and does not discuss a cause of action. The plaintiff, a seaman, became ill on the
defendant's ship. Id. at 1196. He brought suit for damages, claiming that the defendant had failed to
comply with a statute requiring English ships to maintain "a sufficient supply of medicines suitable
to accidents and diseases arising on sea voyages." Id. Lord Campbell stated that an action on the
case was generally available for '"damage by the wrong of another,"' and that 'in every case, where
a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same
statute for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a wrong done to him
contrary to the said law."' Id. (quoting JOHN COMYNS, DIGEST 268 (1762)). Consequently, the
seaman could recover. Id. at 1198.
The case was complicated by the fact that the statute provided for a penalty against the shipowner
for its violation, to be paid in part to the person reporting the infraction and in part to the Seaman's
Hospital Society. Id. at 1196. This raised the question whether a court could order a different
remedy. Lord Campbell concluded that the statutory penalty was for the public wrong and did not
abrogate the plaintiff's right to seek damages for the private wrong done to him. Id. at 1197. Lord
Campbell added two qualifications. If a statute provided one mode of compensating plaintiff for his
personal injuries, a court should not authorize another. And if the legislature specifically forbade an
action by a person injured for violation of the statute, the person could not recover. Id.
Not all English cases of this era accord with Ashby and Couch. See, e.g., Atkinson v. Newcastle &
Gateshead Waterworks Co., 2 Ex. D. 441,444 (1877) (questioning Couch)- Stevens v. Jeacocke, 116
Eng. Rep. 647, 652 (Q.B. 1848) (holding that imposition of penalty precluded private remedy).
24. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992) ("From the earliest years
of the Republic, the Court has recognized the power of the Judiciary to award appropriate remedies
to redress injuries actionable in federal court, although it did not always distinguish clearly between
a right to bring suit and a remedy available under such a right.").
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v. Madison25 provides a famous example. Marbury brought a mandamus
action to compel the Secretary of State to deliver a commission signed by
the President appointing him to the bench.26 Chief Justice Marshall
quoted Blackstone conceming the relation between right and remedy:
"[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal
right, there is also a legal remedy by suit or action at law, whenever
that right is invaded.... [F]or it is a settled and invariable principle
in the laws of England, that every right, when withheld, must have
a remedy, and every injury its proper redress." '27
Kendall v. United States28 provides another such example. Several indi-
viduals sought payment from the Postmaster General for performance of
a contract to deliver mail.29 Congress passed a statute directing the
Solicitor of the Treasury to investigate and to determine the equities of
the matter.3" When the Postmaster refused to pay the full amount the
Solicitor recommended, the individuals sued.3 In granting relief, the
Court stated:
It cannot be denied but that congress had the power to command
that act to be done; and the power to enforce the performance of the
act must rest somewhere, or it will present a case which has often
been said to involve a monstrous absurdity in a well organized
govemment, that there should be no remedy, although a clear and
undeniable right should be shown to exist.32
25. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
26. Id. at 153-54.
27. Id. at 163 (quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *23). Chief Justice Marshall
continued: "The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of
laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no
remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." Id.
28. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
29. Id. at 608.
30. Id. at 608-09.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 624. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992), mischaracterizes
the statute involved in Kendall. Speaking for the majority, Justice White stated that the Act of
Congress "accorded a right of action in mail carriers to sue for adjustment and settlement of certain
claims for extra services but... did not specify the precise remedy available to the carriers." Id. at
67. As noted above, the statute was in the nature of a private bill that merely directed the Solicitor of
the Treasury to look into the mail carriers' claim and recommend an equitable solution. Kendall, 37
U.S. at 528-29. The statute did not create a "right of action in mail carriers to sue." Kendall did not
appear to consider a private right of action an independent or necessary part of the right-remedy
equation. The modem Court is so accustomed to viewing a cause of action as a separate and
necessary component of a lawsuit that it mistakenly read the statute in Kendall to create one.
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Again, the Court closely related right and remedy without mentioning a
cause of action.
During the late 1800s and early 1900s, American state courts
routinely allowed private remedies for violations of statutes containing
other sanctions,33 although sometimes on a slightly different legal theory.
Violation of a statute was said to constitute "evidence of negligence"34 or
"negligence per se."3' Plaintiffs could recover if they were members of
the class of persons for whose benefit the statute was intended and the
harm suffered was of a kind that the statute generally was intended to
prevent.36 Arguably these cases recognize a cause of action for
33. See, e.g., Osborne v. McMasters, 41 N.W. 543 (Minn. 1889); Schell v. Dubois, 113 N.E. 664
(Ohio 1916); Stehle v. JaegerAutomatic Mach. Co., 69 A. 1116 (Pa. 1908). For extensive citation to
such cases, see W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAw OF ToRTS 220-34 (5th
ed. 1984).
34. See, e.g., Vandewater v. N.Y. & New Eng. R.R., 32 N.E. 636, 636-37 (N.Y. 1892) (stating
that violation of statute could be evidence of negligence, but reversing and remanding for new trial
because applicable statute had been repealed at time of accident); MeRickard v. Flint, 21 N.E. 153,
153 (N.Y. 1889) (stating that failure to perform statutory duty "is evidence upon the question of
negligence").
The federal courts occasionally relied on this theory. For example, in Hayes v. Michigan Central
Railroad, 111 U.S. 228 (1884), the plaintiff was a young boy whose left arm was severed in a
collision with defendant's train. Id. at 231-32. The plaintiff claimed that the railroad had violated a
Chicago ordinance granting it a right of way on the condition that it erect fences along the rail line to
protect persons and property from danger. Id. at 229-30. The Court held that the failure to fence
would support an action for personal injury, and that "this breach of duty will be evidence of
negligence." Id. at 240. The railroad argued that it could not be liable to a member of the public
injured by violation of the ordinance, id. at 233, but the Court disagreed. Because the City had
enacted the ordinance to protect the public, "considered as composed of individual persons," it
followed that "each person specially injured by the breach of the obligation is entitled to his
individual compensation, and to an action for its recovery." Id. at 240.
35. See, e.g., Maney v. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 49 Il1. App. 105 (1892); Correll v.
Burlington, Cedar Rapids & Minn. R.R. Co., 38 Iowa 120,121 (1874); Jetter v. N.Y. & Harlem RR.
Co., 2 Abbot 458,464 (N.Y. 1865)
[It is an] axiomatic truth that every person while violating an express statute is a wrong-doer,
and, as such, is ex necessitate negligent in the eye of the law, and every innocent party whose
person is injured by the act which constitutes the violation of the statute is entitled to a civil
remedy for such injury, notwithstanding any redress the public may also have.
Id. But see Brown v. Buffalo & State Line R.R. Co., 22 N.Y. 191, 195 (1860) (rejecting argument of
plaintiff that violation of city ordinance prohibiting locomotives from running at more than six miles
per hour "was alone evidence of carelessness, sufficient to charge the defendant with the
consequences ofthe collision"). For support of the negligence per se rule, see Ezra R. Thayer, Public
Wrong and Private Action, 27 HARV. L. REV. 317 (1914). The development of the theory that
violation ofa statutory duty constitutes negligence per se is discussed in Foy, supra note 6, at 540-
48.
36. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 33, at 224-25. These standards were incorporated in the
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1934):
Violations Creating Civil Liability.
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negligence as a separate element of the right-remedy equation.
Negligence, however, was a general, pre-existing common law cause of
action.37 The courts did not purport to imply a new cause of action from
the specific statutes in question. Nor did they apply any special criteria
for deciding whether to use the negligence theory, other than the general
requirements noted above.38 The opinions also stressed the close relation
between rights and remedies.39
Courts did not automatically grant relief every time a plaintiff came
to court seeking to enforce a provision of a statute. Courts sometimes
concluded that the statutory language did not actually create the rights
and duties that the plaintiffs claimed or that granting relief would
frustrate rather than further legislative intent.4" Courts also denied relief
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to do a required
act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest of the other as
an individual;
(b) and the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect;
(c) and, where the enactment is intended to protect an interest from a particular hazard, the
invasion of the interests results from that hazard;
(d) and, the violation is a legal cause of the invasion, and the other has not so conducted
himself as to disable himself from maintaining an action.
Id.
37. See WILLIAM A. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 139-40 (1971) ("About the year 1825,
negligence began to be recognized as a separate and independent basis of tort liability.").
38. The requirements that the statute be intended at least in part to protect the class of persons of
which the plaintiff is a member and that the harm suffered was of a kind the statute generally was
intended to prevent are plainly satisfied by, or are at least consistent with, the early English and
American cases. The statute in Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), protecting the right to
vote, plainly was intended to protect voters like Mr. Ashby and to ensure that voters were not
improperly denied the right to vote. Id. at 135-36. Similarly, the statute in Couch v. Steel, 118 Eng.
Rep. 1193 (K.B. 1854), requiring sufficient medicines on board during sea voyages clearly was
intended to protect members of the crew like Couch and to prevent unnecessary suffering and
sickness due to lack of proper medicine. Id. at 1196. The statute in Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838), directing the Solicitor of the Treasury to look into the plaintiffs' claim against
the Postmaster was intended specifically to aid the plaintiffs in obtaining fair compensation under
their contract to deliver mail. Id. at 608-09.
39. See, e.g., Parker v. Barnard, 135 Mass. 116, 120 (1883) ("The fact that there was a penalty
imposed by the statute for neglect of duty in regard to the railing and protection of the elevator well
does not exonerate those responsible therefor from such liability."); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184,
186 (Mich. 1845) ("It is a general principle of the common law, that whenever the law gives a right,
or prohibits an injury, it also gives a remedy by action; and, where no specific remedy is given for an
injury complained of, a remedy may be had by special action on the case."); Martin v. Herzog, 126
N.E. 814, 816 (N.Y. 1920) (Cardozo, J.) ("A statute designed for the protection of human life is not
to be brushed aside as a form of words, its commands reduced to the level of cautions, and the duty
to obey attenuated into an option to conform.").
40. See. e.g., Pollard v. Bailey, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 520,524-25 (1874), discussed at infra note 42.
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when the legislature specifically forbade a particular remedy.41 But even
when courts denied relief, they conducted an integrated inquiry that
treated the claimed right and proposed remedy as a unit.42
In 1916, the U.S. Supreme Court decided the often-cited case Texas
& Pacific Railway v. Rigsby.43 Rigsby strongly reaffirmed the equation of
rights and remedies, but it also appeared to treat a cause of action as a
separate part of the equation, thus foreshadowing the radical develop-
ments in the later part of the twentieth century. The plaintiff was a
switchman for the railway company.' He was injured when a defective
handhold gave way as he descended from the top of a box car.45 He sued
for damages under a federal statute requiring trains in interstate
commerce to have secure handholds, and the Court held that such relief
was available.' The Court reiterated the close, reciprocal relation
between rights and remedies:
A disregard of the command of the statute is a wrongful act, and
where it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to recover the damages
41. See supra note 23.
42. Pollard provides a good example of an integrated right-remedy inquiry in a case denying
relief without mention of a cause of action as a separate requirement. In 1854 the Alabama
legislature chartered a new bank. Pollard, 87 U.S. at 521. The legislation contained provisions in
case the bank became insolvent. Id. at 521-22. Individual stockholders were to be personally liable
for all outstanding debts of the bank in proportion to their share of the stock. Id. at 521. If the bank
could not pay a debt, the creditor could file a bill in the chancery court asking for a temporary
injunction freezing the bank's assets and for appointment of a receiver. Id. After distributing the
bank's assets, remaining debts could be assessed against each of the stockholders in proportion to his
shares of stock. Id. at 521-22. In due course the bank became insolvent. Id. at 522. Bailey, a creditor,
brought an action at law against one of the stockholders, Pollard, seeking $17,000, the full amount
that Bailey was owed. Id.
The Court held that the Alabama statute did not grant Bailey a right to the relief that he claimed.
Id. at 524-25. Pollard had a duty to pay only his pro rata share of the debts. Id at 525. This
proportion could be determined only after a pro rata distribution of the indebtedness among all the
stockholders in an equity action. Id. Granting relief to Bailey would frustrate the clear legislative
intent "only to charge the stockholders upon a proper account and in the manner" provided by the
statute. Id. Moreover, the legislature also intended to distribute funds for the common benefit of all
of the creditors. Id. at 527. The Court thought that "fe]very provision [of the statute] is entirely
inconsistent with the idea that one creditor could, by an individual suit, appropriate to himself the
entire benefit of the security, and exclude all others." Id. The court concluded with language that
showed the close relation between the duty (and the right) and the remedy: "There was no liability
except for the deficiency. That was to be apportioned and collected for the common benefit ... The
lilibility and the remedy were created by the same statute. This being so the remedy provided is
exclusive of all others." Id.
43. 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
44. Id. at 36.
45. Id. at 37.
46. Id. at40.
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from the party in default is implied, according to a doctrine of the
common law expressed.., in these words: "So, in every case,
where a statute enacts, or prohibits a thing for the benefit of a
person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute for the thing
enacted for his advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done
to him contrary to the said law." (Per Holt, C.J., Anon., 6 Mod. 26,
27.) This is but an application of the maxim, Ubijus ibi remedium.
See 3 Black. Com. 51, 123; Couch v. Steel, 3 El. & Bl. 402, 411; 23
L. J. Q. B. 121, 125. 47
This language is often quoted by the U.S. Supreme Court and commen-
tators4 and is generally seen as a ringing endorsement of traditional
conceptions of rights and remedies.49 However, Rigsby also made several
specific references to "a right of action" in the sentences immediately
before and after the language quoted above, thus suggesting that the
Court viewed a cause of action as a separate component of the rights-
remedies equation." Moreover, although the language is ambiguous, the
Court may have been suggesting that it was inferring the cause of action
from the statute itself." Thus, Rigsby is a perplexing case in that it
47. Id. at 39-40. The term ubijus ibi remedium is translated "[wjhere there is a right, there is a
remedy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1695 (7th ed. 1999).
48. See, e.g., Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 67 (1992); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 n.52 (1982); California v. Sierra Club,
451 U.S. 287, 299-300 & n.3 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring); Richard W. Creswell, The Separation
of Powers Implications of Implied Rights ofAction, 34 MERCER L. REv. 973, 975 (1983); Frankel,
supra note 6, at 555.
49. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 374-75 ("Under this approach, federal courts, following a
common-law tradition, regarded the denial of a remedy as the exception rather than the rule.");
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 299-300 ("[In 1890,J Members of Congress merely assumed that the
federal courts would follow the ancient maxim, 'ubijus ibi remedium.'"); Creswell, supra note 48,
at 975 ("Justice Pitney emphasized that he was applying a well-recognized common-law doctrine.");
Foy, supra note 6, at 554 ("Justice Pitney wrote for the Court in Rigsby .... Justices Story or
Marshall could have written the opinion. Indeed, Coke or Chief Justice Holt could have written it.
Rigsby looked to the past, not to the future.").
50. Referring to different versions of the Federal Safety Appliance Act in the sentence
immediately before the quoted language, the Court stated:
None of the Acts, indeed, contains express language conferring a right of action for the death or
injury of an employee; but the safety of employees and travelers is their principal object, and the
right of private action by an injured employee, even without the Employers' Liability Act, has
never been doubted.
Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 39. In the sentence immediately following the quoted language, the Court stated:
"The inference of a private right of action in the present instance is rendered irresistible" by a
provision of the Act stating that an employee injured by any car "in use contrary to the act shall not
be deemed to have assumed the risk." Id. at 40.
51. The block quote in supra note 50 suggests this possibility because it focuses so specifically on
provisions of the Act. But see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J.,
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endorses the traditional close relation between rights and remedies while
possibly introducing a new element into the equation.
While the seeds of current law treating rights, rights of action, and
remedies as separate elements can be seen in Rigsby, in the years that
followed the Court chose to reaffirm the close interrelation of rights and
remedies, usually without mentioning a cause of action. In several cases
seeking enforcement of the Railway Labor Act of 1926, the Court
granted remedies that were not explicitly authorized by the statute. 2 The
Court reasoned that the remedies must be available or else the rights
conferred by the statute would not exist, and it made no reference to a
cause of action as a separate requirement.53 In Bell v. Hood, 4 the
dissenting) (suggesting novel view that Rigsby combined federal statutory standard with common
law negligence claim).
Interestingly, the Court later talked about a cause of action in connection with subject matter
jurisdiction. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916). As in Rigsby,
the Court may have suggested that a cause of action is separate from a right and remedy, but the
suggestion is only implicit. The plaintiff in American Well Works alleged that defendants
maliciously and falsely libeled and slandered plaintiff's title to a pump by asserting that the pump
infringed defendants' patent. Id. at 258. The Court held that the case did not arise under federal law
because it was at base a tort case for defamation or for unlawfil damage to plaintiff's business. Id. at
259-60. Justice Holmes announced the famous test that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the
cause of action," id. at 260, and since the plaintiff's cause of action was state-created, the case arose
under state law. It is unclear from Holmes' opinion whether he was identifying a cause of action as a
separate procedural entity or simply using the phrase as a short-hand to refer to the merits of the
plaintiffs claims. The Court appears to have denied federal question jurisdiction because plaintiff
asserted state-created rights and duties that did not turn on any questions of federal law.
52. See generally Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 (1944); Tex. & New
Orleans RtR. Co. v. Bhd. ofRy. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930).
53. See, e.g., Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., 281 U.S. 548, where the Court enforced a
provision of the Act that allowed employees to pick their own union representative without
interference by the railroad. The railroad argued that the provision "confer[red] merely an abstract
right which was not intended to be enforced by legal proceedings," id. at 558, but the Court
concluded that "[tihe right is created and the remedy exists," citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803). Te & New Orleans R.R. Co., 281 U.S. at 569-70. The Court believed that
judicial enforcement of the non-interference provision would be manageable and that freedom of
choice in selecting representatives was an essential element of the statutory scheme. Id. at 568-69.
As the Court admitted in 1979, Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. "is now understood as having
implied a'cause of action' although the opinion itself did not use the phrase." Davis v. Passman, 442
U.S. 228, 239 n.17 (1979).
In Steele, another case decided under the Railway Labor Act, the Court explicitly recognized that
rights and duties do not actually exist without a remedy. Steele held that the Act imposed a duty on
the exclusive bargaining representative of railroad firemen to represent all of the firemen without
discrimination because of their race. 323 U.S. at 199-202. The Court stated:
mhe right here asserted, to a remedy for breach of the statutory duty.., is of judicial
cognizance. That right would be sacrificed or obliterated if it were without the remedy which
courts can give for breach of such a duty or obligation and which it is their duty to give in cases
in which they have jurisdiction.
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plaintiffs sought damages for violation of constitutional rather than
statutory rights. The Court once again affirmed the broad availability of
remedies to enforce all legal rights and did not identify a private right of
action as a separate component of the rights-remedies equation:
[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been
the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their
remedies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well
settled that where legal rights have been invaded, and a federal
statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal
courts may use any available remedy to make good the wrong
done."
The reign of the traditional standards continued through the 1960s. In
JI. Case Co. v. Borak,56 the Court allowed a shareholder of J.I. Case to
Id. at 207. The Court also stressed that enforcement of the right of fair representation would further
the basic statutory purpose of avoiding interruptions to commerce by helping to avoid strikes. Id. at
199-200; see also Tunstall v. Bhd. of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen, 323 U.S. 210 (1944)
(companion case to Steele reaffirming opinion in that case).
54. 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
55. Id. at 684 (citations omitted). Looking only at the quoted language, one might read the phrase
"and a federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion" to refer to a cause of
action. Indeed, Justice White made this mistake in Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Commission,
463 U.S. 582 (1983), when he cited Bell for the proposition that "where legal rights have been
invaded and a cause of action is available, a federal court may use any available remedy to afford
full relief." Guardians Ass "n, 463 U.S. at 595. However, the full opinion in Bell makes clear that the
phrase refers to subject matter jurisdiction under the general federal question section of the United
States Code, now 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). Bell, 327 U.S. at 679. Plaintiffs claimed that federal
agents violated their Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Id. The lower courts held that they lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear such a claim. Id. at 680. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed on this
point, holding that the case arose under federal law because the case necessarily turned on the scope
of the protection afforded by the constitutional amendments. Id. at 684-85. The Court did not
describe the issue facing the lower courts on remand as whether a private right of action could be
inferred from the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Instead, the Court stated that "[t]he issue of law is
whether federal courts can grant money recovery for damages said to have been suffered as a result
of federal officers violating the Fourth and Fifth Amendments," id. at 684, and the statements quoted
in the text are some ruminations about that question. In any event, it is plain that the phrase "and a
federal statute provides for a general right to sue for such invasion" could not refer to a section of the
U.S. Code authorizing a damage action against federal agents for violation of the Constitution
because no such section existed. Thus, the quoted language means that authority to grant any
available remedy flows from a simple grant of subject matter jurisdiction. The Court does mention a
cause of action earlier in the opinion, but in connection with the merits of plaintiffs' claim:
Jurisdiction, therefore, is not defeated as respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the
averments might fail to state a cause of action on which petitioners could actually recover. For it
is well settled that the failure to state a proper cause of action calls for ajudgment on the merits
and not for a dismissal for want ofjurisdiction.
Id. at 682.
56. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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sue under §§ 14(a) and 27 of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 for
damages and to rescind a merger allegedly effected through false and
misleading proxy statements. The Court brushed aside defendants'
contention that the Exchange Act made no reference to a private right of
action under § 14(a), stating that among the Act's "chief purposes is 'the
protection of investors,' which certainly implies the availability of
judicial relief where necessary to achieve that result.""8 The Court also
noted that private enforcement of the proxy rules "provides a necessary
supplement to Commission action" due to the volume of proxy
statements submitted annually. 9 Citing the liberal remedial language of
several of the cases discussed above,6° the Court allowed the suit to
proceed.6
57. Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act, along with Rule 14a-9, which was promulgated pursuant
thereto by the Securities and Exchange Commission, made it unlawful to issue false and misleading
proxy statements. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14a-9 (2000). Section 27 is a jurisdictional provision that gives the federal district courts
exclusive jurisdiction "of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty
created by this title or the rules and regulations thereunder." Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27,
15 U.S.C. § 78aa;.IJ. Case Co., 377 U.S. at 427-33.
58. J.I Case Co., 377 U.S. at 432.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 433-34.
61. Id. at 435. Two decisions in 1960 reaffirmed the Court's broad power to order equitable
remedies for violation of statutory duties. In United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482
(1960), the Court read § 10 ofthe Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 to authorize the Attorney General
to seek injunctive relief ordering the steel company to dredge a riverbed where it had deposited
industrial solids. Id. at 485. The Act imposed a broad duty not to "obstruct" navigable waters and
gave the Attorney General power to enforce the Act. Id. at 491-92. The Court stated: "Congress has
legislated and made its purpose clear, it has provided enough federal law in § 10 from which
appropriate remedies may be fashioned even though they rest on inferences. Otherwise we impute to
Congress a futility inconsistent with the great design of this legislation." kI at 492.
In Mitchell v. RobertDeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. 288 (1960), the Court read §§ 15(a)(3) and 17 of
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to allow the Secretary of Labor to bring an action on behalf of
DeMario Jewelry employees seeking wages unpaid in violation of the Act. Id. at 289. Section
15(a)(3) made it unlawful for an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an
employee because the employee filed a complaint under the Act, but it did not specify a remedy. Id.
Section 17 merely gave the district courts jurisdiction to restrain violations of § 15. Id. The Court
held that the remedy sought by the Secretary was easily within the Court's equitable power to
enforce the statute:
"(AII the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and
complete exercise of that jurisdiction.... mhe court may go beyond matters immediately
underlying its equitable jurisdiction... and give whatever other relief may be necessary under
the circumstances.... Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to
be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command.'
Id. at 291 (quoting Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395,397-98 (1946)). The Court reasoned
that an action for reimbursement of lost wages was necessary to achieve congressional purposes. Id.
Congress relied on information and complaints from employees to enforce the Act. Id. at 292. If
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In the late 1960s, the Court also authorized judicial proceedings to
enforce provisions of important civil rights statutes. The Court relied
heavily on the traditional equation of rights and remedies in authorizing
private suits to help achieve the broad remedial purposes of the
legislation. None of these cases made reference to a private right of
action as a separate procedural requirement.62
As in the past,63 the Court did not grant relief to every plaintiff who
sought a remedy for an alleged violation of a statutory duty. The Court
denied relief if it thought the statute did not actually confer the plaintiff's
claimed right64 or that to grant relief would directly conflict with con-
employees could obtain only prospective relief reinstating them to their jobs, they would be reluctant
to complain to officials about violations of the Act because they could not afford to lose their pay
during the period while they sought reinstatement. Id. at 292-93.
62. See, e.g., Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969). The Allen Court allowed
private individuals to seek declaratory judgments that changes in state voting laws were subject to §
5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, and thus, could not be implemented until the state complied with
the approval requirements of the Act. Allen, 393 U.S. at 554-57. The Court stated that the Act's
basic goal to make the Fifteenth Amendment a reality for all citizens would be "severely hampered"
if citizens were required to rely solely on litigation instituted at the discretion of the Attorney
General. Id. at 556. Similarly, Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), allowed a private
suit to enforce 42 U.S.C. § 1982, which provides that "[a]ll citizens.., shall have the same
right... as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to... purchase... real and personal property." The
Court stated:
The fact that [the statute] is couched in declaratory terms and provides no explicit method of
enforcement does not, of course, prevent a federal court from fashioning an effective equitable
remedy. See, e.g., Texas & N.O. R. Co. v. Ry. Clerks, [281 U.S. 548,568-70 (1930)];... United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., [362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960)]; J. . Case v. Borak, [377 U.S.
426,432-35 (1964)].
Jones, 392 U.S. at 414 n.13. Finally, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969),
authorized a private damage action under § 1982, stating that "[t]he existence of a statutory right
implies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies." Id. at 239. The Court quoted from
Rigsby, Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co., and Bell. Id. at 238-39.
In another important decision in this period that applied traditional standards, Wyandotte
Transportation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967), the Court allowed the government to sue
to recover its expenses in removing a sunken barge from the Mississippi River. Id. at 193, 204. The
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 did not specifically authorize such a suit, but § 15 of the Act made it
unlawful negligently to sink a vessel in navigable waters and imposed a duty on the owner to remove
it. Id. at 197. The Court stated that allowing the government to sue for its expenses when the owner
refused to remove the barge was consistent with the overall purposes of the statute and avoided an
unfair windfall to the owner. Id. at 201-04.
63. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text.
64. For example, in Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S.
246 (1951), the Court held that a provision of the Federal Power Act requiring utilities to charge just
and reasonable rates "creates no right which courts may enforce." Id. at 251. The parties in the case
were power companies, and one charged the other with fraud in rate setting that occurred when the
companies had an interlocking directorate. See id. at 247-48. The district court found the rates
unreasonable, determined what would have been reasonable rates, and gave judgment for the
difference. See id. at 248. The U.S. Supreme Court stated the district court was wrong "to regard
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gressional intent.6 ' But such cases did not purport to change the
governing standards or to identify a cause of action as a separate
component of the rights-remedies equation.
B. The Modern Standards
The late 1960s were the final days of the traditional standards. The
Court made radical changes in the years that followed, dividing what
previously had been a single, unified inquiry about whether a statute
created judicially enforceable obligations into three separate and distinct
questions. While traditionally the Court equated rights and remedies and
rarely mentioned a cause of action, suddenly the Court sharply differen-
tiated between rights, rights of action, and remedies. Moreover, the Court
reasonableness as a justiciable legal right rather than a criterion for administrative application in
determining a lawful rate." Id. at 251. Any remedy thus lay with the Federal Power Commission, not
the courts. See id
This decision evoked a spirited dissent. Justice Frankfurter, writing for himself and three other
justices, thought that the traditional rights-remedies standards required a different result. See id. at
261-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He noted that the administrative remedies suggested by the
majority were inadequate and that the "aim of Congress would be needlessly aborted if this 'definite
statutory prohibition of conduct' did not impose civil liability.., merely because no judicial relief
was explicitly authorized." Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). He strongly reaffirmed the
traditional standards:
Courts, unlike administrative agencies, are organs with historic antecedents which bring with
them well-defined powers. They do not require explicit statutory authorization for familiar
remedies to enforce statutory obligations. Texas & NO. R. Co. v. Brotherhood of R. & S.S.
Clerks, [281 U.S. 548]; irginian R. Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, [300 U.S. 515 (1937)];
Deckert v. Independence Shares Corp., [311 U.S. 282 (1940)]. A duty declared by Congress
does not evaporate for want of a formulated sanction. When Congress has "left the matter at
large for judicial determination," our function is to decide what remedies are appropriate in light
of the statutory language and purpose and of the traditional modes by which courts compel
performance of legal obligations.... If civil liability is appropriate to effectuate the purposes of
a statute, courts are not denied this traditional remedy because it is not specifically authorized.
Texas & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, [241 U.S. 33 (1916)]; Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., [323
U.S. 192 (1944)]; Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, [323 U.S.
210 (1944)]; ....
Id. at 261-62 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also T.I.M.E. Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 464,
469-72 (1959) (following Montana-Dakota approach in declining to imply cause of action for
shippers against carriers under Motor Carrier Act and also noting that Congress had twice considered
and rejected attempts to amend statute to grant shippers such cause of action).
65. A court generally would not conclude that the legislature intended to preclude a particular
remedy unless it explicitly so stated. See, e.g., Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398
(1946) ("Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not to be denied or
limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative command."); Hecht v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321,
329-30 (1944) ("[I]f Congress had intended to make such a drastic departure from the traditions of
equity practice, an unequivocal statement of its purpose would have been made.').
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soon adopted separate criteria to decide whether a statute should be read
to create a right, imply a cause of action, or provide a remedy.
Two cases in the mid-1970s signaled that change was afoot. In
National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of Railroad
Passengers66 and Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,7 the
Court focused solely on whether a private right of action in favor of the
plaintiffs could be inferred from the statute involved.68 In National
Railroad Passenger Corp., plaintiffs sought to enjoin discontinuance of
certain passenger trains, claiming that procedures required by the Rail
Passenger Service Act of 1970 had not been followed before terminating
service.69 In Barbour, some customers of a broker-dealer sought to
compel the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) to exercise
its statutory authority for their benefit.7° In both cases, the Court
ultimately refused to imply a private right of action because plaintiffs'
suits might actually block achievement of the statutory goals. 7' While
this problem would likely have caused the Court to deny relief under
66. 414 U.S. 453 (1974).
67. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
68. Nat l R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 456. The Court stated:
[T]he threshold question clearly is whether the Amtrak Act or any other provision of law creates
a cause of action whereby a private party such as the respondent can enforce duties and
obligations imposed by the Act; for it is only if such a right of action exists that we need
consider [standing and jurisdiction].
Id. at 456; see also Barbour, 421 U.S. at 413-14 ("The question presented by this case is whether
such customers have an implied private right of action under the Securities Investor Protection
Act... to compel [Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC)] to exercise its statutory
authority for their benefit.").
69. Nat'I R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 455 n.3.
70. Barbour, 421 U.S. at 413-14.
7 1. The legislative history of the Rail Passenger Service Act showed that Congress considered
and specifically rejected a provision that would have permitted suit to enforce the Act's provisions
"by 'any person adversely affected or aggrieved."' Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 414 U.S. at 460-61
(quoting Supplemen.:al Hearings on HR. 17849 and S. 3706 before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong. 85 (1970)
(statement of Secretary of Transportation)). Moreover, Congress believed that "in order to achieve
economic viability in a basic rail passenger system," it was necessary to pare uneconomic routes. Id.
at 461. If suits could be brought all over the country to block discontinuance, with injunctions
pendente lite, this could frustrate or at least severely delay passenger train discontinuance, with
possible dire economic consequences. Id. at 463-64. Similarly, in Barbour the Court thought that
"the overall structure and purpose of the SIPC scheme are incompatible with such an implied right."
421 U.S. at 421. Intervention of SIPC in the affairs of a brokerage house was likely to put the house
out of business by driving away current customers and other brokers. Id. at 422-23. SIPC thus treats
an application for appointment of a receiver and liquidation of a firm as a last resort. Id. at 421. The
Court feared that customers could not be expected to consider the public interest in timing their
decision to apply to the courts. Id. at 422.
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traditional standards,' the singular focus on implication of a private right
of action was new.
The Court reaffirmed the separate status of a cause of action in Cort
v. Ashn3 and set forth four criteria federal courts should use to decide
whether to imply a private right of action from a federal statute.74
Plaintiff Ash, a stockholder in Bethlehem Steel Corporation, contended
that the management of the company had authorized use of corporate
funds for political advertisements in the 1972 presidential campaign in
violation of a federal criminal statute.75 Ash sought injunctive relief
against further expenditures and damages in favor of the corporation.76
"[T]he principal issue presented for decision," the Court stated, "is
whether a private cause of action for damages against corporate directors
is to be implied in favor of a corporate stockholder under [the criminal
statute]." The Court presented the following four criteria for deciding
that question:
In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one, several factors are relevant. First, is the
plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted," Texas & Pacific R. Co. v. Rigsby... (emphasis
supplied)-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?
See, e.g., National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Assn. Of
Railroad Passengers... (Amtrak). Third, is it consistent with the
underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a
remedy for the plaintiff?. See, e.g., Amtrak, supra, Securities
Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour .... And finally is the cause
of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area
basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate
to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?... cf J. .
Case Co. v. Borak. ...
72. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
73. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
74. Id. at 78.
75. Id. at 71-72.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 68.
78. Id. at 78. (citing See. Investor Prot. Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 412,423 (1975); Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp. v. Nat'1 Ass'n oft R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453,458 (1974); J.I. Case Co. v. Borak,
377 U.S. 426,434 (1964); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,39 (1916)).
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Most commentators saw Cort not as effecting a major change in the
law, but as an attempt to consolidate and harmonize precedent. 79 But the
significance of Cort depends on how one looks at precedent. If one
accepts the Court's implicit characterization of several hundred years of
decisions as implied right of action cases, then Cort makes little change.
But if one sees Cort as a major step in the separation of rights, rights of
action, and remedies, then Cort makes a very large change indeed. Until
Cort (and National Railroad Passenger Corporation and Barbour), the
Court had never identified a cause of action as a separate and essential
entity connecting a right and a remedy. Cort thus began a radical
reconceptualization of the rights-remedies equation.0
Davis v. Passman' explicitly confirmed that the Court henceforth
would consider rights, causes of action, and remedies as "analytically
distinct." 2 Ms. Davis asserted that Congressman Otto Passman had
discriminated against her on the basis of sex in violation of the Fifth
Amendment." Congressman Passman countered that the Fifth Amend-
79. See, e.g., Ashford, supra note 6, at 242 ("In articulating and applying each of the four
factors ... the Court was careful to provide specific precedents... and said nothing to indicate that
it regarded its analysis as a departure from its previous approach or precedents.'); George D. Brown,
Of Activism and Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the
Federal Courts, 69 IowA L. REv. 617, 630 (1984) ("Unless Justice Brennan was trying to sandbag
the whole concept of implied rights, the four factors ought to be taken for what he says they are: a
distillation of prior case law to aid 'in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute
not expressly providing one.") (citations omitted); Frankel, supra note 6, at 559 ("[Cort]
attempt[ed) to assemble sixty years of case law relating to the implication of private remedies into a
harmonious whole.'). I must admit taking the same view myself. See Zeigler, supra note 6, at 709
n.233 ("My own view is that Cort did not represent a major departure from prior law. The first three
factors focus on different aspects of legislative intent that were considered by courts, at least
implicitly, as early as Couch v. Steel.'). I did (and still do) agree with Thomas Hazen that the fourth
factor-the federalism factor-is new. Cf Hazen, supra note 6, at 1359. U.S. Supreme Court
Justices have also disagreed about the significance of Cort. In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982), Justice Stevens stated that Cort modified the traditional
approach by shifting the focus primarily to the intent of Congress in enacting the statute. Id. at 377.
By contrast, in Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), Justice Powell characterized
the four-factor analysis of that case as "an open invitation to federal courts to legislate causes of
action not authorized by Congress." Id. at 731 (Powell, J., dissenting).
80. In the years immediately following Cort, the justices conducted a Cort analysis in several
cases, thus reaffirming that they considered a cause of action to be a separate and critical part of the
rights-remedies equation. See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 316-17 (1979); Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,59-72 (1978); Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., 430 U.S. 1, 37-41
(1977).
81. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
82 Id. at 239.
83. Ms. Davis's claim on the merits was quite compelling because Congressman Passman sent her
a letter telling her he was firing her because she was a woman. See id. at 230 n.3.
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ment did not provide a private right of action. 4 The court of appeals
agreed with Passman based on a Cort analysis and affirmed dismissal of
the suit." The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that Cort, with its
heavy emphasis on legislative intent, did not provide the proper standard
for deciding whether a cause of action should be implied from the
Constitution.86 But the Court took pains to distinguish rights, causes of
action, and remedies. After concluding that the plaintiff "assert[ed] a
constitutionally protected right,"8" the Court went on to differentiate a
cause of action and a remedy:
[Clause ofaction is a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a
member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law,
appropriately invoke the power of the court; and relief is a question
of the various remedies a federal court may make available. A
plaintiff may have a cause of action even though he be entitled to
no relief at all ....88
Davis thus cemented the trifurcation of rights, rights of action, and
remedies.89
In the years following Davis, the Court continued to treat rights,
rights of action, and remedies as distinct, and to develop different criteria
for each of the three parts of the new rights-remedies equation. The next
section briefly reviews the Court's developing doctrine for all three parts,
beginning with implication of private rights of action.
1. Rights ofAction
Cort v. Ash itself soon came under attack by a Court increasingly
hostile to judicial enforcement of federal statutory rights unless
enforcement was explicitly authorized by Congress. In Touche Ross &
84. Id. at 232.
85. Id. at 232-33.
86. Id. at 239-40.
87. Id. at 234.
88. Id. at 239 n.l 8. The Court also distinguished between the meaning of a cause of action in the
rights context and in the pleading context. While a cause of action connects a right to a remedy, in
pleadings a cause of action "refer[s] roughly to the alleged invasion of 'recognized legal rights' upon
which a litigant bases his claim for relief." Id. at 237 (quoting Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 693 (1949)).
89. For good measure, the Court identified two other distinct questions: "[J]urisdiction is a
question of whether a federal court has the power, under the Constitution or laws of the United
States, to hear a case... ; standing is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a
defendant to create an Art. III case or controversy .... "Id. at 239 n. 18.
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Co. v. Redington Trustee" and Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis,9 the Court abruptly elevated the second Cort criterion-whether
Congress intended to create a private right of action-and downplayed
the other three criteria. In Touche Ross, the Court refused to imply a
private right of action under § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 on behalf of brokerage firm customers against accountants who
conducted a faulty audit of the firm's records.92 The Court stated that
"our task is limited solely to determining whether Congress intended to
create the private right of action asserted" by the plaintiffs.93 The Court
explicitly stated that the four Cort factors are not of equal weight and
refused to consider plaintiffs' argument that the third and fourth Cort
factors favored implication, stating that "such inquiries have little
relevance to the decision of this case., 94 Transamerica echoed Touche
Ross: "[W]hat must ultimately be determined is whether Congress
intended to create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions
have made clear.... We accept this as the appropriate inquiry to be
made in resolving the issues presented by the case before us."95
In the years following Touche Ross and Transamerica, the Justices
bickered about whether Cort v. Ash retained any vitality. Cort became
like a ghost attempting to regain solid form, appearing relatively
substantial in one case only to fade to transparency in the next. Between
April and June of 1981, the Court tried five times to define Cort's status
without reaching agreement, and while all of the Justices appeared to
concede that congressional intent was now the key factor, the other Cort
factors were given a large role in some cases and barely mentioned in
others. 96 In Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox97 and Massachusetts Mutual
90. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
91. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
92 See Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 570.
93. Id. at 568 (emphasis added).
94. Id. at 575.
95. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 15-16 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568).
96. In Universities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981), the Court stated that to
determine the ultimate question of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action, it
would consider three factors set forth in Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), that it had traditionally
relied upon in determining legislative intent: the language and focus of the statute, its legislative
history, and its purpose. Univs. Research Ass'n, 450 U.S. at 770 (citing Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at
575-76). This language suggested that the Court would use the disfavored Cort factors to help
discern the answer to the favored factoi: whether Congress intended to create the private right of
action. The Court's language, however, is at best a very vague statement of the Cort factors. The
fourth factor-whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law-is not
ientioned at all. The Court subsequently indicated that it would not consider the fourth factor in this
case. Id. at 770 n.21. In the Court's second attempt to clarify Cort's status, the Court restated the
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Life Insurance Co. v. Russell,98 both decided several terms later, the
Court acknowledged that congressional intent is the main focus, but then
proceeded to conduct a full-blown four-factor analysis.99 Justice Marshall
made a Herculean attempt to harmonize all of these cases in Thompson v.
factors in yet another form. In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transportation Workers Union, 451 U.S.
77 (1981), the Court stated:
The ultimate question... is whether Congress intended to create the private
remedy .... Factors relevant to this inquiry are the language of the statute itself, its legislative
history, the underlying purpose and structure of the statutory scheme, and the likelihood that
Congress intended to supersede or to supplement existing state remedies.
Id. at 91.
Cort emerged in somewhat more solid form in California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
Speaking for the majority and quoting his own dissenting opinion in Transamerica, Justice White
said that Cort provided a '"preferred approach for determining whether a private right of action
should be implied from a federal statute."' ld. at 292 (quoting Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 26 (White,
J., dissenting)). He then listed the four factors accurately and completely and stated that they
remained "the criteria through which" the intent of Congress to create a private right of action "could
be discerned." Id. at 293 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,241 (1979)). This was too much for
Justice Rehnquist who, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Powell, wrote a
separate concurrence to complain that "the Court's opinion places somewhat more emphasis on Cort
v. Ash ... than is warranted in light of several more recent 'implied right of action' decisions which
limit it." Id. at 302 (Rehaquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist continued:
These decisions make clear that the so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the central task
of ascertaining legislative intent... that they are not of equal weight... and that in deciding an
implied right of action case courts need not mechanically trudge through all four of the factors
when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved.
Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630
(1981), made only brief reference to the issue, stating that the focus is on the intent of Congress and
that the other Cort factors are used to discern intent. Id. at 639. Justice Powell, a vehement opponent
of implied rights of action, see Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730-49 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting), got the final word of the 1980 term in Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National
Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981). The opinion focused on the narrow question of whether
Congress "intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for private citizens," id.
at 14, and pointed to the statutory language, legislative history, "and other traditional aids of
statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent" without mentioning either Cart or the four
factors, iL at 13.
97. 464 U.S. 523 (1984).
98. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
99. Id. at 145-48; Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 535-42. The Court also occasionally slips the
issue of what current law is by focusing on "the state of the law at the time the legislation was
enacted." Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 378 (1982). If the
statute was enacted at a time when the Court applied the traditional standards for determining
whether a statutory right could be judicially enforced, the Court is likely to imply a private right of
action, reasoning that the Congress that enacted the statute would have expected the Court to do so.
See, e.g., Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186,230-31 (1996) (implying private right of action
under Voting Rights Act because it was passed at time when Court applied "highly liberal standard
for finding private remedies"); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 378-82 (continuing to recognize private
right of action under reenacted statutory provision when private right of action had been implied
under earlier provision).
Washington Law Review
Thompson."° His language cannot be summarized or paraphrased, but
must be quoted:
In determining whether to infer a private cause of action from a
federal statute, our focal point is Congress' intent in enacting the
statute. As guides to discerning that intent, we have relied on the
four factors set out in Cort v. Ash... along with other tools of
statutory construction. See Daily Income Fund, Inc. v.
Fox... California v. Sierra Club... Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington .... Our focus on congressional intent does not mean
that we require evidence that Members of Congress, in enacting the
statute, actually had in mind the creation of a private cause of
action. The implied cause of action doctrine would be a virtual dead
letter were it limited to correcting drafting errors when Congress
simply forgot to codify its evident intention to provide a cause of
action. Rather, as an implied cause of action doctrine suggests, "the
legislative history of a statute that does not expressly create or deny
a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on
the question." Cannon v. University of Chicago .... We therefore
have recognized that Congress' "intent may appear implicitly in the
language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of its
enactment." Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis .... The intent of Congress remains the ultimate issue,
however, and "unless this congressional intent can be inferred from
the language of the statute, the statutory structure, or some other
source, the essential predicate for implication of a private remedy
simply does not exist." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers .... 1o1
100. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). Justice Marshall spoke for himself and Justices Rehnquist, Brennan,
White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
101. Id. at 179 (citing Daily Income Fund, 464 U.S. at 535-36; Northwest Airlines, 451 U.S. at
94; California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v.
Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 18 (1979); Touch Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694, (1979); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)). Justice
Scalia erupted: "[T]he Court is not being faithful to current doctrine in its dicta denying the necessity
of an actual congressional intent to create a private right of action, and in referring to Cort v.
Ash ... as though its analysis had not been effectively overruled by our later opinions." Id. at 188
(Scalia, J., concurring). He continued: "I am at a loss to imagine what congressional intent to create
a private right of action might mean, if it does not mean that Congress had in mind the creation of a
private right of action." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring). He also accused the Court of conveying "a
misleading impression of current law when it proceeds to examine the 'context' of the legislation for
indication of intent .. I." Id. at 189 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor joined this part of
Justice Scalia's opinion, but not the final part where he suggested that "we should get out of the
business of implied private rights of action altogether." Id. at 192 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Recently, Justice Kennedy acknowledged that "[t]he Court has
encountered great difficulty in establishing standards for deciding when
to imply a private cause of action under a federal statute which is silent
on the subject."' 2 While the standards are unclear, the results are not. By
definition in these cases, the statute in question does not expressly create
the cause of action the plaintiff wishes to employ. The legislative history
is usually silent about whether Congress meant to create a private right of
action. Thus, requiring clear evidence of congressional intent to create a
private right of action ensures that few will be found. 03 The Court rarely
acknowledges the broader implications of its restrictive implication
doctrine because it chooses to treat a cause of action as a separate
procedural entity, apart from rights and remedies.'"' But whether the
Court acknowledges it or not, no right of action also means no right and
no remedy.0 5
2. Rights
Whether a statute confers definable rights and duties is the logical
starting point for any application of the rights-remedies principles.
Traditionally, courts analyzed the issue in a facially intelligible way as a
part of single, unified inquiry. Thus, the statute in Ashby v. White
guaranteeing the right to vote plainly gave a right to vote to a qualified
voter; ° the statute in Couch v. Steel requiring adequate medicines on
board ship gave a right to seamen to have those medicines in place;'0 7 the
statute in Rigsby requiring secure handholds on trains gave train workers
a right to have solid, not defective, handholds on the trains' 8 The
traditional approach was summed up in the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: a
statute conferred a right as long as it was intended for the benefit of the
class of persons of which the plaintiff was a member, and the harm
suffered was of a kind that the statute generally was intended to
prevent. 9
102. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629, 656 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103. Thompson, 484 U.S. at 190 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pointing out that Court rejected claims of
implied right of action in nine of eleven recent cases). For a listing of recent lower court decisions
denying private rights of action, see Stabile, supra note 6, at 870 n.54.
104. See supra notes 66-89.
105. See infra notes 223-28 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 23.
108. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text
109. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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Maine v. Thiboutot"° precipitated the U.S. Supreme Court's recent
focus on rights as a separate part of the rights-remedies equation.
Thiboutot held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 encompasses claims against state
and local officials for federal statutory violations as well as for federal
constitutional violations."' This holding suggested that state or local
officials could be sued in federal court for the violation of any federal
law"' and raised the specter of an avalanche of new cases."3 Because
§ 1983 provided an explicit, all-purpose cause of action, to avoid the
specter of a flood of new litigation, the Court had to find new ways to
limit the right and remedy parts of the right/right of action/remedy triad.
The Court took the first step to limit rights in Pennhurst State School
& Hospital v. Halderman. "4 The plaintiff was a resident of Pennhurst, a
Pennsylvania facility housing the mentally retarded.' She brought a
class action alleging that the "unsanitary, inhumane, and dangerous"
conditions at Pennhurst violated, inter alia, § 6010 of the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act."16 She
sought injunctive and monetary relief and asked that Pennhurst be closed
and that "community living arrangements" be made for the residents." 7
The Court concluded that the § 6010 conferred no rights on the plaintiffs
and thus denied relief." 8
On its face, § 6010 appears to confer rights on persons like the
plaintiffs in Pennhurst. Section 6010 is entitled a "bill of rights"
provision, and states that "Congress makes the following findings,"
including that "[p]ersons with developmental disabilities have a right to
appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation" which "should be
provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the person's personal
liberty."" 9 The Court nullified this seemingly straightforward language
110. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
111. See id. at 4.
112. See ERwlN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 527 (3d ed. 1999); Sunstein, supra note
6, at 394.
113. See Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 22-23 (Powell, J., dissenting) (asserting that "[n]o one can predict
the extent to which litigation arising from today's decision will harass state and local officials; nor
can one foresee the number of new filings" under literally hundreds of cooperative federal-state
programs enacted by Congress).
114. 451 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court also quickly moved to limit remedies in § 1983 cases. See infra
notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
115. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 5.
116. Id. at 6.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 11, 31. Ultimately the Court remanded the case for consideration of other claims raised
by the plaintiffs. Id. at 30-31.
119. Id. at 13.
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in several steps. The Court identified the issue as whether Congress
intended § 6010 to create enforceable rights '2 and then set forth some
general guidelines to discern intent. First, the Court said that the case for
inferring intent "is at its weakest where, as here, the rights asserted
impose affirmative obligations on the States to fund certain services,
since we may assume that Congress will not implicitly attempt to impose
massive financial obligations on the States."'' Second, the Court
established a "clear statement" requirement for statutes, like the Act in
Pennhurst, enacted pursuant to Congress's spending power." While
Congress can fix the terms on which it will disburse federal money to the
states, such legislation is like a contract.'2 For a state to voluntarily and
knowingly accept the terms of the contract, the terms must be very
clear.24 Thus, "if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."'"
With these two principles in place, the Court turned to § 6010 and
stated that it found nothing in the Act or in the legislative history to
suggest that Congress meant to impose on the States the cost of
providing appropriate treatment in the least restrictive setting for
mentally retarded citizens. 26 Because § 6010 only made a "finding" that
persons with developmental disabilities have a right to treatment and
habilitation in a least restrictive setting, it did not actually create the
rights and obligations that plaintiffs claimed. 127 After reviewing the
legislative history, the Court concluded that the provisions of § 6010
"were intended to be hortatory, not mandatory."'" As for the clear
statement rule, the Court held that the phrases "appropriate treatment"
and "least restrictive setting" were ambiguous, and thus did not provide
sufficiently clear notice to the states of their obligations in exchange for
the federal money.'29
The Court refined the criteria for deciding whether a statute creates a
right in subsequent cases. In Wright v. City ofRoanoke Redevelopment &
120. See id at 15.
121. Id. at 16-17.
122. See id at 17. The spending power is contained in article I, section 8, clause 1 of the
Constitution, which reads "Congress shall have Power to... provide for the... general Welfare of
the United States." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 356 n.7 (1992).
123. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17.
124. Id
125. Id.
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 18-19.
128. Id. at24.
129. See id at 24-25.
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Housing Authority,3 ° plaintiffs claimed that the Housing Authority
overbilled them for utilities in violation of the Brooke Amendment to the
United States Housing Act of 1937."3 The Amendment limited rent paid
by low-income families, including utilities, to thirty percent of their
income.12 The Court held that the Brooke Amendment gave the tenants
rights because the thirty percent limit was a mandatory provision
intended to benefit the tenants.133 Moreover, the Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) regulations requiring that a "reasonable" amount
for utilities be included in the rent payment were not "too vague and
amorphous" or "beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce."' 134
This reasoning suggested a three-part test that the Court subsequently
articulated in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles: 35
In deciding whether a federal right has been violated, we have
considered whether the provision in question creates obligations
binding on the governmental unit or rather "does no more than
express a congressional preference for certain kinds of treatment."
Pennhurst .... The interest the plaintiff asserts must not be "too
vague and amorphous" to be "beyond the competence of the
judiciary to enforce." Wright .... We have also asked whether the
provision in question was "intend[ed] to benefit" the putative
plaintiff. Id. 136
The Court has continued to apply the three-part Golden State test in
recent years, sometimes finding that a statute creates an enforceable
right, 13' and sometimes not. 38 The Court also has continued to treat the
130. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
131. Id. at 419.
132. Id. at 420-22.
133. Id. at 429-30.
134. ld. at 431-32.
135. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
136. Id. at 106 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 431-32; Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman,
451 U.S. 1, 19 (1981)). Golden State arose from a labor dispute between the transit corporation and
its union. The City of Los Angeles conditioned renewal of the transit corporation's taxi franchise on
settlement of the dispute. Id. at 104. In an earlier ruling, the Court held that the City had violated
federal labor law by taking this action. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 475 U.S. 608,
618-19 (1986). On remand the district court ordered the city to reinstate the franchise but declined to
award damages under § 1983; the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 104-05. Applying the criteria set
forth in the quotation above, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the corporation was "the intended
beneficiary of a statutory scheme that prevents governmental interference with the collective-
bargaining process." Id. The Court also held "that the NLRA [National Labor Relations Act] gives it
rights enforceable against governmental interference in an action under § 1983," id. at 109, and
remanded the case for further proceedings, id. at 113.
137. See, e.g., Lividas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 132-33 (1994) (concluding that action by
California Commissioner of Labor violated plaintiff's rights under NLRA); Wilder v. Va. Hosp.
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question of whether a statute confers a right as analytically distinct from
the question of whether a private right of action should be implied.139
3. Remedies
After separating rights, rights of action, and remedies, the Court
developed separate, relatively restrictive criteria for deciding whether a
statute creates a right and whether to imply a right of action from a
statute. The record regarding remedies is more mixed. While recent U.S.
Supreme Court decisions articulate many reasons for limiting or denying
remedies, the Court has on occasion reaffirmed its broad remedial
powers. The Court may be hesitant to restrict its power to order an
effective remedy when it believes circumstances warrant full relief.
Traditionally, courts were willing to make available all appropriate
remedies to enforce rights."4 Most modem cases, by contrast, are ringed
about with reservations.'41 The Court developed several limitations on
Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1990) (holding that Medicaid Act gave Virginia health care provider
right to state medical plan that provided rates of payment that are reasonable and adequate to meet
costs incurred by efficiently operated facility).
138. See, e.g., Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341-42 (1997) (holding that Title IV-D of
Social Security Act, which required states to take adequate steps to obtain child support payments
from fathers of children, did not confer enforceable rights on custodial parents); Suter v. Artist M.,
503 U.S. 347, 363 (1992) (holding that provision of Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of
1980, requiring states to have plan providing that reasonable efforts will be made to keep children
out of foster care, did not confer any rights on foster children).
139. The Court occasionally notes the interplay of the two questions, while treating them as
separate inquiries. For example, in Suter, the district court and court of appeals both found that the
statutory provisions in question could be enforced under § 1983 and by means of an implied right of
action. Suter, 503 U.S. at 353-54. The U.S. Supreme Court first concluded that the statutory
provisions did not create an enforceable right, and then separately and summarily concluded that if
Congress had not meant to create an enforceable right, there was nothing to create a cause of action
to enforce. Id. at 363-64. Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), sparked a
disagreement among the Justices about the relationship between rights and rights of action. The
majority considered them to be separate, id. at 508 n.9, while the dissent sought to equate the
question "Does the statute create a right?" with the first Cort criterion, id. at 525 (Rehnquist, CJ.,
dissenting). Wilder is discussed at infra notes 241-57 and accompanying text.
140. See supra Part I.A.
141. The Court signaled that it would be somewhat more restrictive in granting equitable
remedies in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982). The restrictions were not all new;
some merely restated traditional limits or preconditions. Id. at 311-13. But by compiling lists of
limitations, and adding some new limits for good measure, the Court implicitly suggested that it
would follow a more cautious, restrictive approach to equitable remedies. Id. In Weinberger,
residents of Puerto Rico sued to enjoin the Navy from using Vieques, a small island off Puerto
Rico's coast, for target practice. See id. at 307. The plaintiffs claimed that discharging ordnance into
the water around the island without first obtaining a permit from the Environmental Protection
Agency violated several federal laws, including the Federal Water Pollution Control Act. Id. at 307-
08. The district court refused to issue the injunction, although it did order the Navy to apply for a
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remedies in cases where plaintiffs sought damages for violation of
constitutional rather than statutory rights. For example, Davis v.
Passman, 4 2 the first case stating that rights, rights of action, and
remedies are "analytically distinct,' 143 also suggested that damages might
be inappropriate for a violation of a constitutional right if: a) there were
special factors counseling hesitation, b) the case presented unfocused
remedial issues posing difficult questions of valuation or causation, or c)
allowing damages would result in a flood of new cases."
The Court found special factors counseling hesitation in two cases
brought by enlisted military personnel claiming constitutional violations
by superior officers. 145 The Court refused a damage remedy in both cases
because it did not want to interfere with military discipline or Congress's
permit. Id. at 309-10. The court of appeals held that the statute required an immediate injunction
halting the bombing until a permit was obtained. Id. at 310-11. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed
and remanded the case for the court of appeals to consider whether the district court abused its
discretion in failing to order an injunction. Id. at 306, 320. Initially the Court appeared to construe
federal equitable powers broadly by stressing the flexibility of equity and need to mold decrees to fit
the particular needs of each case. Id. at 312. However, the Court then listed reasons why injunctions
should be denied. An injunction is not a remedy "which issues as of course" or to deal with trifling
matters. Id. at 311 (quoting Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337-38
(1933)). An injunction should be denied unless the plaintiff can show irreparable injury and the
inadequacy of legal remedies. Id. at 312. Finally, "courts of equity should pay particular regard for
the public consequences" of ordering an injunction, and deny relief if it might adversely affect the
public interest. Id. The Court appeared to believe that these principles supported denial of an
injunction in this case. See id. The Navy's technical violation of the federal statute was not causing
any appreciable environmental harm. Id. at 307. Thus, the harm might be characterizing as "trifling"
rather than "irreparable." Moreover, the national interest might be harmed if the Navy could not use
the island to train its gunners. Id. at 310. Ultimately, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
court of appeals to determine whether the district court abused its discretion when it declined to issue
an injunction. Id. at 320.
The controversy over the use of Vieques for target practice continues. See Elizabeth Becker,
Puerto Rico Governor Seeks a Ban on Vieques Bombing, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2001, at A 18.
142. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
143. Id. at 239; see also supra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
144. Id. at 245-48. The Court allowed a damage remedy in Davis because none of these
conditions were met. Id. at 248. Although a suit against a Congressman claiming that he acted
unconstitutionally in the course of his duties raised "special concems counseling hesitation," the
Court held the concerns were coextensive with the protections afforded by the Speech and Debate
Clause of the Constitution. Id. at 246. The Court also believed that "damages would be judicially
manageable," id. at 245, and did not see the potential for a deluge of new lawsuits, id. at 248.
The Court also allowed a damage remedy for violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), but thereafter
"responded cautiously to suggestions that [damage] remedies be extended into new contexts,"
Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412,421 (1988).
145. See generally United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S.
296 (1983).
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plenary authority over military matters."4 The Court also found special
factors counseling hesitation in two other cases claiming denial of
constitutional rights where plaintiffs had obtained substantial relief
through administrative remedies, even though the relief was
incomplete. 47 In those cases, the Court concluded that the elaborate and
carefully thought-out remedial schemes set up by Congress should not be
augmented with new remedies created by the judiciary. 4 '
The Court used similar reasoning to limit remedies in § 1983 actions
against state and local officials for violation of federal statutes, holding
that comprehensive statutory remedies raise a presumption that Congress
intended to preclude use of § 1983. In Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 49 for example, plaintiffs sued
local, state, and federal officials responsible for dumping sewage and
other waste into the Atlantic Ocean, claiming that the pollution was
causing the "collapse of the fishing, clamming and lobster industries."'' 0
Plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that defendants were violating the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act and the Marine Protection, Research, and
Sanctuaries Act of 1972 and sought declaratory and injunctive relief and
damages.' The Court first declined to imply a private right of action
under the two statutes" 2 and then raised on its own the question whether
146. See Stanley, 483 U.S. at 681; Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304.
147. In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), plaintiff was returned to his job and got back pay for
an improper retaliatory demotion, but was unable to obtain attorney's fees or damages for emotional
distress and mental anguish. Id. at 371-72, 388. In Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988),
plaintiffs were eventually restored to disabled status and were awarded full retroactive benefits after
being wrongly terminated from a Social Security program, but were unable to obtain damages for
emotional distress and other hardships suffered because of the delays in the receipt of their benefits.
See id at 425, 428-29.
148. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 428-29; Bush, 462 U.S. at 389. Another factor may have made the
Court particularly reluctant to grant a damage remedy in Schweiker. The lawsuit could be seen as an
attempt by the plaintiffs to make an end run around the restrictive standards prevailing in the 1980s
for implication of private rights of action from statutes. Schweiker, 487 U.S. at 418-19. Plaintiffs
alleged that several federal officials and one state official who were "acting under color of federal
law" took actions violating the Social Security Act, and that these actions denied them due process
of law. Id. It was unlikely that a private right of action on their behalf would be implied under the
Social Security Act; thus, the request for a remedy directly under the Fifth Amendment provided
their only hope for relief(§ 1983 could not be used because the suit was against federal officials).
Lawsuits against federal agencies often assert a failure to follow mandated procedures. If all or even
many of these actions could be converted into constitutional actions under the Fifth Amendment and
proceed on that basis, then the Touche Ross-Transamerica restrictions could be circumvented.
149. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
150. Id. at 4-5.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 11-18. The Court used the Touche Ross-Transamerica standards, see supra notes 90-
95 and accompanying text, that focus on whether Congress intended to create a private right of
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§ 1983 might provide plaintiffs with an alternate source of congressional
authorization to sue. 53 It quickly answered the question in the negative,
stating that "[w]hen the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are
sufficiently comprehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate
congressional intent to preclude the remedy of suits under § 1983.''1
The Court found it "hard to believe that Congress intended to preserve
the § 1983 right of action when it created so many specific statutory
remedies, including the two citizen-suit provisions.' ' 55 Consequently, it
held that § 1983 was unavailable.16
The Court reaffirmed this new limitation on judicial remedies in
subsequent § 1983 cases. In Smith v. Robinson 57 the Court held that
Congress intended the comprehensive procedures and guarantees autho-
rized in the Education of the Handicapped Act to be the exclusive means
by which a handicapped child could raise an equal protection claim and
that § 1983 could not be used.'58 On the other hand, Wright v. City of
Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Authority159 made it somewhat
easier to enforce federal statutes through § 1983 by placing the burden on
the defendant state or local officials to demonstrate that Congress
intended to foreclose § 1983 actions, and by holding that creation of
general administrative remedies or fund cut-off procedures would not
ordinarily suffice to show congressional intent to preclude use of
§ 1983.160
action. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. at 14. Since the Acts contained elaborate enforcement mechanisms
that conferred authority to sue on both government officials and private citizens, the Court
concluded that Congress did not intend "to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies for
private citizens." Id.
153. Id. at 19.
154. Id. at 20.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 21.
157. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
158. Id. at 1011-12.
159. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
160. Id. at 427-28. The Court noted that in both Sea Clammers and Smith v. Robinson the statutes
involved provided for some private judicial enforcement, thus evidencing an intent to supplant
§ 1983. Id. at 427. The statute at issue in Wright, by contrast, had no such provisions. Id.; see also
Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-23 (1990) (holding that defendants had not carried
their burden of showing that Medicaid Act contained comprehensive remedial scheme because Act
contained no provisions for private judicial or administrative enforcement and fund cut-off
mechanism was not sufficient to foreclose reliance on § 1983).
The Court has continued to reaffirm the "comprehensive remedial scheme" exception to the use of
§ 1983 in recent years. See Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (stating that Congress
can specifically foreclose § 1983 remedy "expressly, by forbidding recourse to § 1983 in the statute
itself, or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with
individual enforcement under § 1983."); Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 133 (1994) (same).
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Given the relatively restrictive remedies decisions in the 1970s and
1980s, it was a surprise in 1992 when the Court appeared to reaffirm the
traditional generous remedial principles. Franklin v. Gwinnett County
Public Schools'6 1 accomplished this result by sharply distinguishing
between rights, rights of action; and remedies, 62 and by holding that the
restrictive standards for creating rights and implying rights of action do
not apply to remedies.163 In Franklin, plaintiff alleged that a high school
teacher subjected her to continual sexual harassment and "coercive
intercourse."'' She alleged that other teachers and administrators knew
about this conduct and about similar incidents with other students but did
nothing. 165 The offending teacher finally resigned on the condition that
the matter be dropped, and the school closed its investigation."6 Ms.
Franklin brought suit under Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972.167 The district court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
Title IX does not authorize a damage award, and the court of appeals
affirmed. 168
The U.S. Supreme Court began by reaffirming the decision in
Cannon v. University of Chicago,169 which held that Title IX was
enforceable through a private right of action. 7° The Court then carefully
distinguished the issue presented by Franklin, stating that "in this case
we must decide what remedies are available in a suit brought pursuant to
this implied right.'' The Court reiterated that "the question of what
remedies are available under a statute that provides a private right of
action is analytically distinct from the question of whether a private right
of action exists in the first place."' 72 Thus, the implied right of action
cases cited by the defendants with their emphasis on whether Congress
161. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
162. Id. at 65-66.
163. Id. at 66.
164. Id. at 63.
165. Id. at 64.
166. Id.
167. Id. The pertinent portion of Title IX reads: "No person in the United States shall, on the basis
of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance... " 20 U.S.C.
§ 1681(a) (1994).
168. See Frankin, 503 U.S. at 64.
169. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
170. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 65-66 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 239 (1979)). Davis is discussed supra
notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
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intended to create a private right of action were simply "inapposite."' 73
The Court cited many of the venerable cases establishing a reciprocal
relation between rights and remedies 74 and stated that once a right and a
cause of action are in place, "we presume the availability of all
appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indicated
otherwise."'75
The Court found nothing in the legislative history of Title IX, which
was enacted when the traditional norms were firmly in place, to indicate
that Congress would not want a damage remedy for violation of Title
IX. 176 Moreover, any limitation that might flow from the fact that Title
IX was enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause did not apply because
the plaintiff alleged an intentional violation of the statute.'77 Finally, the
Court rejected the suggestion that relief under Title IX should be limited
to back pay and prospective relief.7 ' Ms. Franklin would take nothing
from either remedy. Ms. Franklin was a student, not a teacher;, the
offending teacher no longer taught at the school, and she was no longer a
student there. 1
79
The Court recently retreated from its liberal statements of Franklin in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District80 and Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education.'' Both cases limit the scope of the
damage remedy available against a school district under Title IX and
reaffirm that the Court considers rights, rights of action, and remedies to
be distinct. Ms. Gebser had a sexual relationship with a teacher at her
school but did not report the relationship to school officials.'82
Subsequently, the parents of two other girls complained to the principal
about comments the teacher made in class, and the teacher was cautioned
to be careful in the future. 83 A few months later a police officer
173. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 69 n.6.
174. The Court cited Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946), Texas & Pacific Railroad Co. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. 33 (1916), Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 624 (1838), Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), Ashby v. White, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1703), and many
other traditional cases. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66-69.
175. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 66. The Court asserted that "[tihis principle has deep roots in our
jurisprudence." Id.
176. Id. at 71-73.
177. Id. at 74-75. The Court believed that the school district plainly was on notice that Title IX
prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex and that countenancing the teacher's conduct amounted
to a knowing violation of Title IX. Id.
178. Id. at 75-76.
179. Id. at 76.
180. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
181. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
182. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277-78.
183. Id. at 278.
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discovered the plaintiff and the teacher having intercourse and arrested
the teacher, who was subsequently fired.184 Ms. Gebser and her mother
filed suit in state court against the school district claiming, inter alia,
violation of Title IX." The case was removed to federal court and the
Title IX claim was dismissed on the ground that the school district did
not have sufficient notice of the teacher's conduct." 6 The court of
appeals affirmed.
1 17
The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that past cases had
established each of the three separate elements of the rights-remedies
equation in Title IX cases: Students have a right to be free from sexual
harassment,"' an implied private right of action exists, 9 and damages
are available in the implied private action.' 9 The Court made clear that
this case concerned only the scope of the remedy: "We made no effort in
Franklin to delimit the circumstances in which a damages remedy should
lie.''. Because the cause of action was judicially created, the Court
believed that it had "a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial
scheme that best comports with the statute."192 The Court then restricted
the circumstances in which damages could be recovered. The Court
stated that statutory structure and purpose were "pertinent not only to the
scope of the implied right [of action], but also to the scope of the
available remedies."'93 While the general rule is that federal courts can
use all available remedies to vindicate federal rights,"9 the rule must
yield "'where necessary to carry out the intent of Congress or to avoid
frustrating the purposes of the statute involved."' 95 The plaintiffs argued
that the school district should be held to a respondeat superior standard
of liability, or at least to a constructive-notice standard, making it liable
for damages if officials knew or should have known about harassment
184. Id
185. Id. at 278-79.
186. Id. at 279.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 281-82. The Court noted that Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57
(1986), held that a supervisor discriminates against an employee on the basis of sex when the
supervisor sexually harasses the employee and that Franklin applied the same rule when a teacher
sexually harasses a student. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281-82.
189. Id. at 281 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979)).
190. Id. (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)).
191. Id at 284.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 284-85.
195. Id at 285 (quoting Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 595 (1983)
(White, J.)).
Washington Law Review
but failed to address it.'96 The Court thought that either of these standards
would frustrate the purposes of Title IX. Because Title IX was enacted
under the Spending Clause, the Court reasoned that the plaintiffs'
proposed standard would improperly result in liability without notice to
an "appropriate person" and an opportunity to rectify any violation. 9 7 To
avoid this problem, the Court adopted the following standard of liability:
We conclude that damages may not be recovered [for the sexual
harassment of a student by one of the district's teachers] unless an
official of the school district who at a minimum has authority to
institute corrective measures on the district's behalf has actual
notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct.198
The Court's analysis in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education'99 is similar to its analysis in Gebser. The issue was whether a
school district can be liable for damages under Title IX for the sexual
harassment of one student by another.2" The Court again separated the
right, right of action, and remedy, stating that student-on-student sexual
harassment can rise to the level of discrimination under Title IX, that a
private right of action exists, and that money damages are available.
20 1
As in Gebser, the Court purported to consider only the scope of the
remedy. 0 2 The Court again relied on the Spending Power analysis to
restrict the damage remedy. Private damage actions are available "only
where recipients of federal funding [have] adequate notice that they
could be liable for the conduct in issue.' 203 The Court stated that the
school district could be liable only for its own misconduct.2t, The school
district could only be said to "expose" its students to harassment or
"cause" them to undergo it if two conditions were met. First, the school
district must exercise "substantial control over both the harasser and the
context in which the.., harassment occurs;"' 5 and second, the school
district must have actual knowledge of the harassment and be
196. Id. at 282-83.
197. Id. at 287-88.
198. Id. at 277, 290-91.
199. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
200. Id. at 632-33.
201. Id. at 639-40.
202. Id. at 639 ("[A]t issue here is the question whether a recipient of federal education funding
may be liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for discrimination in the form of
student-on-student sexual harassment.").
203. Id. at 640.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 645.
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deliberately indifferent to it.2°6 The Court tacked on one further limitation
for good measure. To recover damages, a victim of student-on-student
sexual harassment must establish "harassment that is so severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive, that it effectively bars the victim's
access to an educational opportunity or benefit." '2 7
Part I has shown that traditionally courts equated rights and remedies
without considering whether the statute in question provided a private
right of action. Recently, the Court divided what had previously been a
unified inquiry into three separate questions and developed separate,
relatively restrictive criteria to decide whether a statute should be read to
create a right, imply a right of action, or provide a remedy. Part II of this
Article explains why rights, rights of action, and remedies are
interrelated2 " and makes the case for development of a single, integrated
206. Id. at 646-47, 650.
207. Id. at 633.
208. Interestingly, there is a group of three cases in which the modern Court recognized the
interrelation of rights, rights of action, and remedies. The issue in all three cases was whether a right
of contribution existed on behalf of someone found liable under a particular federal statute. The
Court seemed uneasy talking about all three elements at the same time, and the discussions are
somewhat jumbled.
In Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), the airline sued for
contribution from two unions that it claimed were partly to blame for a policy of differential pay for
male and female cabin attendants that resulted in a substantial money judgment against the airline in
an earlier action. Id. at 79-80. The airline claimed that it had an implied cause of action under the
Equal Pay Act, or alternately, a federal common law right to contribution. Id. at 82. The Court
assumed arguendo that all of the elements ofa typical contribution claim were established. Id. at 88-
90. It then made the following statement that appears to recognize the interrelation between the three
elements, although the Court did not elaborate:
None of these assumptions, however, provides a sufficient basis for recognizing the right
petitioner is asserting in this proceeding.
That right may have been created in either of two ways. First, it may have been created by
statute when Congress enacted the Equal Pay Act or Title VII. Even though Congress did not
expressly create a contribution remedy, if its intent to do so may fairly be inferred from either or
both statutes, an implied cause of action for contribution could be recognized on the basis of the
analysis used in cases such as Cort v. Ash, [422 U.S. 68 (1975)] .... Second, a cause of action
for contribution may have become a part of the federal common law through the exercise of
judicial power to fashion appropriate remedies for unlawful conduct.
Id. at 90. The Court went on to deny the right of contribution. Id. at 98-99.
The Court in Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), considered
whether a defendant found liable in an antitrust case could seek contribution from other participants
in the unlawful conspiracy. Id. at 632. It is hard to tell from the Court's language whether it is
equating the right and the right of action, or simply mixing them up. The Court stated:
There is no allegation that the antitrust laws expressly establish a right of action for
contribution. Nothing in these statutes refers to contribution, and if such a right exists it must be
by implication. Our focus, as it is in any case involving the implication ofa right of action, is on
the intent of Congress.
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standard for deciding whether a statutory provision should be judicially
enforceable.
Id. at 639. The Court concluded Congress did not intend to authorize a right of contribution. Id. at
639-40.
Finally, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993), the
Court considered whether defendants in a suit based on the implied right of action under § 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission
may seek contribution from joint tortfeasors, Id. at 288. Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court
does not present an integrated analysis of rights, rights of action, and remedies. Instead, it hopelessly
jumbles them. The problems begin with the question on which certiorari was granted: .'Whether
federal courts may imply a private right to contribution in Section 10(b) ... and Rule 1Ob-5 .... '
Id. at 289-90 (quoting petition for writ of certiorari). It is unclear from this statement whether the
Court was deciding if it should imply a right or imply a right of action. Although rights, rights of
action, and remedies are inextricably related, they are not the same thing. Justice Kennedy made
several statements that treated the three parts of the equation as synonymous:
The private right of action under Rule lOb-5 was implied by the Judiciary on the theory courts
should recognize private remedies to supplement federal statutory duties, not on the theory
Congress had given unequivocal direction to the courts to do so.... Thus, it would be futile to
ask whether the 1934 Congress also displayed a clear intent to create a contribution right
collateral to the remedy. ...
[Touche Ross, Transamerica, and their progeny] caution against the creation of new causes
of action .... They teach that the creation of new rights ought to be left to legislatures, not
courts .... [W]hether the right of a tortfeasor to seek contribution from those who share, or
ought to share, joint liability is recognized by statute... or as a matter of common law, in both
instances the right is thought to be a separate or independent cause of action.
Id. at 291-92. The Court ultimately granted a right of contribution in Musick. Id. at 298.
It is intriguing to ponder why the Court talks of rights, rights of action, and remedies together in
Northwest Airlines, Texas Industries, and Musick, while it considers them separately in so many
other cases. There are two possible reasons. First, in the contribution cases all three parts of the
rights-remedies equation were at issue. The cases are unlike those in the Thiboutot line, where §
1983 created a cause of action and the focus was on the "rights" part of the equation, or the recent
Title IX cases, where the Court took the right and right of action as established, and focused only on
the remedy. Thus, the procedural setting in the contribution cases invited a discussion of all three
elements. Second, in the contribution cases, the right is defined in terms of the remedy. The right is a
right to a remedy: contribution. This makes it almost impossible to talk about the right and the
remedy as separate entities. In most cases the right is not a right to a remedy, but rather a right to
have another act or forbear from acting in a particular manner-for example, to tell the truth in a
proxy statement, or avoid discriminating on the basis of race-and this facilitates separate
discussions of rights and remedies.
Although the discussions in Northwest Airlines, Texas Industries, and Musick are somewhat
confused, on the positive side they suggest that the Court might be moving, however haltingly, in the
right direction.
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II. TOWARD A NEW TEST FOR DECIDING WHETHER A
STATUTORY PROVISION SHOULD BE JUDICIALLY EN-
FORCEABLE
Rights, rights of action, and remedies are inextricably related. A
court cannot make a decision about one of them without necessarily
affecting the other two. A decision that focuses just on one element
without acknowledging the impact on the other two is incomplete and
may distort the meaning of the statute in issue and undermine
congressional intent. Thus, the Court has been wrong to consider
separately whether a statute confers a right, implies a right of action, or
authorizes a remedy. All three questions are really part of a single,
broader inquiry: Assuming the plaintiff can prove the case, does the
applicable statutory provision entitle the plaintiff to the particular judicial
remedy he or she seeks? One inquiry should have one test for answering
it.
The further questions "what should the test be?" and "how should it
be applied?" cannot be answered simply or mechanically. How one
answers these questions depends on one's views on such matters as the
role of the federal courts in the federal system, separation of powers, the
Erie doctrine, judicial activism, and on several pragmatic concerns. Part
II of this Article groups together positions on these issues to form two
general models governing the judicial enforcement of federal statutes. It
denotes one model the adversarial model and the other the cooperative
model. This sets the stage for Part I of this Article, which seeks to
establish a middle ground between the two models.
A. The Case for a Single, Integrated Standard
1. The Interrelation ofRights, Rights of Action, and Remedies
Rights, rights of action, and remedies are interrelated conceptually
and practically. The interrelation flows first from the very definitions of
the terms. A legal right imposes a correlative duty on another to act or to
refrain from acting for the benefit of the person holding the right.2" From
this definition it follows that
[A] right without a remedy is not a legal right; it is merely a hope
or a wish.... Unless a duty can be enforced, it is not really a duty;
it is only a voluntary obligation that a person can fulfill or not at his
whim. In such circumstances, the holder of the correlative "right"
209. See Hohfeld, supra note 2, at 35-38.
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can only hope that the act or forbearance will occur. Thus, a right
without a remedy is simply not a legal right.2"'
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools"' illustrates this point.
If the plaintiff could not obtain damages from the school district for
sexual harassment by a teacher, then the school district had no legal duty
to protect her. It could protect her or not as it wished. Thus, without a
remedy, plaintiff had no legal right as against the school district to be
free of sexual harassment by teachers.
The kind of remedy that one may obtain also defines the scope and
meaning of the right. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics"l provides an example. The Fourth
Amendment grants people a right "to be secure in their persons [and]
houses.., against unreasonable searches and seizures."' Bivens alleged
that federal agents violated this right by entering his apartment without a
warrant or probable cause, terrorizing his family, searching the entire
premises, and using unreasonable force to arrest him.214 It is unclear from
the Court's opinion whether the agents found the narcotics they were
searching for, but assume that they did. If Bivens' only remedy was to
raise the Fourth Amendment violation in defense of his criminal
prosecution, then his Fourth Amendment right meant that Bivens could
successfully defend a criminal prosecution. This is obviously important;
however, because the Court decided that damages could be obtained for a
210. Zeigler, supra note 6, at 678 (footnotes omitted). Many jurisprudential scholars accept this
conclusion. See, e.g., THEODORE M. BENDrrr, RIGHTS 51 (1982) ("[O]ne can't say that he has a
right, then and there, to do something if he is not permitted, then and there, to do it. Another way of
putting this is to say that a right doesn't exist if one can't act on it (or insist on it)."). Joel Feinberg
states:
Why is the right to demand recognition of one's rights so important? The reason, I think, is that
if one begged, pleaded, or prayed for recognition merely, at best one would receive a kind of
beneficent treatment easily confused with the acknowledgment of rights, but in fact altogether
foreign and deadly to it.
JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY 141 (1980); see also IREDELL
JENKINS, SOCIAL ORDER AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 254-55 (1980) ("The doctrine of legal rights
teaches us that declarations of rights are vain without an effective apparatus to implement them.').
Some writers include the element of enforceability in their definition of legal rights. See, e.g.,
MORRIS GINSBERG, ON JUSTICE IN SOCIETY 74 (1965) ("Legal rights are claims enforceable at
law.'); JENKINS, supra, at 247 ("Natural rights are merely claims, regardless of the intellectual
justification and emotional fervor with which they are pressed.'); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1324
(6th ed. 1990) (defining "right" as "legally enforceable claim of one person against another, that the
other shall do a given act, or shall not do a given act').
211. 503 U.S. 60 (1992); see supra notes 161-79 and accompanying text.
212. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
213. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
214. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 389.
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Fourth Amendment violation, the right also meant that Bivens could




Thus, the kind of remedy a person may obtain defines both the scope and
meaning of the right.2"6
Decisions about rights also directly affect remedies. If a court
decides that a statutory provision does not confer a right on the plaintiff
because the provision is not mandatory or because it is too vague and
amorphous, then the plaintiff obviously gets no remedy at all. For
example, in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,217 the
Court concluded that the Bill of Rights provision in the statute at issue
only made "findings" that were intended to be hortatory, not mandatory,
and that the phrases "appropriate treatment" and "least restrictive
setting" were too ambiguous to provide sufficiently clear notice to the
States of what they agreed to if they took federal money.1 8 Because the
statute conferred no rights on the plaintiffs, they were entitled to no
remedy.
In other cases a court may decide that although a statute creates
rights and duties, they are not as broad as the plaintiffs claim. If
plaintiffs are unable to fit their case within the court's narrow definitions,
they are effectively remediless. For example, in Central Bank ofDenver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, NA., 2 9 an issuer of bonds
defaulted, and bondholders sued the issuer and several other parties
under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934," ° which imposes
private civil liability on those who commit a manipulative or deceptive
act in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. Plaintiffs sought
to hold one of the defendants, Central Bank, "'secondarily liable under §
10(b) for its conduct in aiding and abetting the fraud."' 221 The Court
215. Id. at 390-91.
216. Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), and Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988),
discussed supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text, also illustrate this point. In Bush, the
plaintiff was returned to his job and got backpay foran illegal retaliatory demotion, but was unable
to obtain attorney's fees or damages for the emotional distress and mental anguish. 462 U.S. at 371-
72, 388. Similarly, in Schweiker, the plaintiffs eventually were restored to disabled status and were
awarded full retroactive benefits after being wrongly terminated from a Social Security disability
program, but they were unable to obtain damages for the emotional distress and other hardships
suffered because of the delays in the receipt of their benefits. 487 U.S. at 425,428-29. In both cases,
the limits on the remedy limited the scope and meaning of the rights.
217. 451 U.S. 1 (1980); see supra notes 114-129 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 126-29 and accompanying text.
219. 511 U.S. 164(1994).
220. Id. at 168.
221. Id. (quoting plaintiffs' complaint). The bonds were issued by a local Colorado building
authority to finance public improvements at a planned residential and business center. Id. at 167. The
bonds were secured by landholder assessment liens. Id. The bond covenants mandated that the land
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declined to extend § 10(b) to impose a duty on parties who do not
directly engage in the illegal deception, but merely aid or abet the
violation.222 Plaintiffs thus had no rights against Central Bank, and no
remedy.
A decision about a cause of action directly affects both rights and
remedies. A cause of action in this context, whether created explicitly or
implicitly, is something that says, in effect, "If someone violates your
legal right you can sue him for relief. ,21 Section 1983 creates what is
probably the best-known federal cause of action.224 In awkward phrasing,
it says that if a person acting under color of state law deprives someone
of a federally protected right, the injured party can sue the wrongdoer for
damages or equitable relief.225 A cause of action thus connects a right and
a remedy. It is an essential link between a right and a remedy that
enables the right to be enforced. Plainly, if you have no cause of action,
you have no right and no remedy. 26 A cause of action also may be
that was subject to the liens be worth at least 160% of the bonds' total outstanding principal and
interest. Id. The covenants also required the developer to give Central Bank, the indenture trustee for
the bond issues, an annual report containing evidence that the 160% requirement was met. Id.
Central Bank did not diligently investigate or ensure that the requirement was met. Id. at 168-69.
222. Id. at 177-78.
223. The meaning of the phrases "cause of action" and "right of action" has been elusive
historically, see supra Part I.A., and it continues to be so today. Justice Powell defined "private
cause of action" to mean "the right of a private party to seek judicial relief from injuries caused by
another's violation of a legal requirement." Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 730 n.l (1979)
(Powell, J., dissenting). Consider Justice Harlan's definition in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 402 n.4 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring):
"The notion of 'implying' a remedy, therefore, as applied to cases like Borak, can only refer to a
process whereby the federal judiciary exercises a choice among traditionally available judicial
remedies according to reasons related to the substantive social policy embodied in an act of positive
law." Justice Brennan defined "cause of action" in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228,239 n. 18 (1979),
as "a question of whether a particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a
matter of law, appropriately invoke the power of the court" and then separated that question from the
question of what remedies should be available. Justice Brennan's definition of cause of action is so
incomplete as to be almost meaningless. The definition begs the question: For what purpose does the
plaintiff want to invoke the power of the court?
224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
225. Section 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....
Id.
226. For example, consider California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), where the Court held
that a fisherman had no cause of action under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of
1899, which forbids obstruction to the navigable capacity of any waters of the United States unless
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defined in a way that limits the available remedy and thus limits the right
as well. For example, Congress sometimes creates a cause of action for
injunctive relief only." 7 As explained above, this sort of limitation on the
remedy necessarily limits the scope and meaning of the right."
In sum, the questions whether the statute confers a right, whether a
cause of action should be implied, and whether a remedy can be granted
do not have much meaning in isolation. A right without a remedy is not a
legal right because it is not enforceable. A right without a cause of action
is not a right for the same reason. A cause of action without a right or
remedy is meaningless. Because a cause of action acts to connect a right
and a remedy, it has no meaning if there is nothing to connect. Finally, a
remedy obviously cannot stand alone either. One is entitled to a remedy
only for the violation of a right.
2. Problems Caused by Trying To Separate the Inseparable
The Court's attempts to separate these inseparable concepts have
caused several problems. The Court's analysis is necessarily incomplete
when it discusses only one part of the rights-remedies equation. By
focusing on only one part of the equation, the Court does not
acknowledge the impact of its decision on the other parts. 9 The Justices
sometimes appear to confuse themselves by their overly narrow focus on
authorized by Congress, to sue California to enjoin it from constructing water diversion facilities that
took fresh water from the delta where he fished and thus degraded the water. Id. at 297-98. By
denying the fisherman a cause of action, the Court also deprived him of any remedy and
extinguished any rights he might have had under the Act. Similarly, when the Court in Suter v. Artist
M., 503 U.S. 347, 350 (1992), refused to imply a private right of action on behalf of children to
enforce a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 requiring state
officials to make reasonable efforts to keep children in their own homes prior to placement in foster
care, it effectively deprived the children of any remedy to enforce this provision, and thus of any
right to have state officials make reasonable efforts to keep them out of foster care.
227. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,150 n.5 (1970) (explaining that Public
Accommodations Act provides injunction as exclusive means of enforcing rights provided in
statute).
228. See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text.
229. The Court's separate treatment of rights, rights of action, and remedies is reminiscent of one
of the Court's tests for deciding whether a case arises under federal law. Under the so-called Mottley
rule, a case arises under federal law only if the federal issue necessarily appears on the face of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152
(1908), even if the case turns on an important issue of federal law that is the only real issue in the
case. Id. The Court essentially puts on blinders and refuses to see what is actually going on. For a
critique of the Mottley rule, see Donald L. Doemberg, There's No Reason for It; It's Just Our
Policy: Why the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question
Jurisdiction, 38 HASTINGS LJ. 597 (1987).
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a single factor. In other cases the Court either disguises or actually
misstates what it is doing.
The continuing controversy over the status of Cort v. Ash 230 is one
example of the confusion caused by separating rights, rights of action,
and remedies. Several of the Justices appear genuinely perplexed and a
bit angry that the ghost of Cort v. Ash will not go quietly.23' Ironically,
even those Justices most adamant that it be banished forever continue to
cite it and discuss the four factors.232 Many of the Justices want to limit
the inquiry in implied right of action cases solely to the second Cort
criteria: Did Congress intend to create the cause of action that the
plaintiff asserts?2 33 It is very difficult, however, to focus only on the
cause of action and ignore the rights being asserted and the remedy
sought. As a result, the first and third Cort criteria234 tend to creep back
in, forcing even the anti-Cort Justices to concede that these factors
remain the means to determine the key issue of congressional intent.235
The first Cort factor continues to be important because the Court
must consider the purpose of a cause of action in deciding whether
230. 422 U.S. 66 (1975); see supra notes 96-101 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 96, 101.
232. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 363-64 (1992) (Rehnquist, CJ.) (referring to
"familiar test of Cort v. Ash" and quoting four-factor test, while noting that most important inquiry is
whether Congress intended to create cause of action plaintiff asserts).
233. See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13
(1981) ("The key to the inquiry is the intent of the Legislature.... We look first, of course, to the
statutory language... [and] [t]hen we review the legislative history and other traditional aids of
statutory interpretation to determine congressional intent."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc.
v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979):
While some opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of
implying private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes
of a given statute,.., what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to
create the private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.
Id.; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 575-76 (1979) ("The central inquiry remains
whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action.').
234. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78. The Court stated:
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,' ... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?.. .. Third, is
it consistent with the underlying purpose of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for
the plaintiff?
Id.
235. See, e.g., California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) ("[T]he ultimate issue is
whether Congress intended to create a private right of action.., but the four factors specified in
Cort remain the 'criteria through which this intent could be discerned."') (quoting Davis v. Passman,
442 U.S. 228, 241 (1979)); accordThompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 179 (1988) (same); Tex.
Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (same); Univs. Research v. Coutu, 450
U.S. 754, 770 (1981) (same).
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Congress intended to create it. A plaintiff does not come to court
asserting a cause of action in the abstract. Instead, a plaintiff asserts that
a particular federal statute grants a right that the defendant has violated,
and asks the Court to imply a cause of action to enforce that right. The
Court must then look at the provision and ask whether "the statute
create[s] a federal right in favor of the plaintiff.1 6 It is almost
impossible to answer the question of whether Congress intended to create
a cause of action to enforce the right the plaintiff asserts without deciding
whether the statute actually confers the right. Consequently, the first Cort
factor continues to be central in implied right of action cases, even when
the Court does not specifically identify it as such, but instead disguises it
as an inquiry into the language of the statute or the legislative history 37
Similarly, it is very difficult for the Court to avoid cqnsidering the
third Cort factor-"is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply [a particular] remedy for the plaintiff?." 8-
in deciding implied right of action cases. By definition, the statute does
not explicitly create the cause of action, and the legislative history is
silent as to whether Congress actually intended to create it.39 If a
statutory provision appears to confer a right on the plaintiff, the Court
would have difficultly deciding whether Congress wanted the right to be
judicially enforceable without looking at whether it would foster or
subvert the underlying statutory purposes to allow such lawsuits. Thus,
unless the Court looks at the overall statutory purposes, it denies itself
access to the information it needs to answer the question whether
Congress intended to create the cause of action.24
236. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
237. See, e.g., Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 16-17 ("[W]e begin with the language of the statute
itself.... It is apparent that the two sections were intended to benefit the clients of investment
advisers...."); Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 568-69 ("[O]ur analysis must begin with the language of
the statute itself... [Section] 17(a) neither confers rights on private parties nor proscribes any
conduct as unlawful.").
238. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
239. See Thompson, 484 U.S. at 179 (noting that '"the legislative history of a statute that does not
expressly create or deny a private remedy will typically be equally silent or ambiguous on the
question' of whether Congress actually had in mind creation of private cause of action) (quoting
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 694 (1979)); Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18 (noting that it is
not surprising that legislative history is silent on whether Congress intended to create private right of
action given that Act does not explicitly provide any private remedies).
240. As with the first Con factor, the Court sometimes discusses the third Cort factor without
explicitly acknowledging that it is doing so. See, e.g., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S.
134, 142 (1985) ("A fair contextual reading of the statute makes it abundantly clear that its
draftsmen were primarily concerned with the possible misuse of plan assets, and with remedies that
would protect the entire plan, rather than with the rights of an individual beneficiary.") (footnote
omitted); Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 18 (explaining that congressional intent to create private right
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The Court's separation of rights, rights of action, and remedies
sometimes leads it to disguise what it is doing. Wilder v. Virginia
Hospital Ass 'n,241 one of the § 1983 cases in the Thiboutot line, provides
such an example. In the guise of deciding whether the statute conferred a
right and whether the private remedy the plaintiff sought was foreclosed
by the existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme, the Court
essentially performed a Cort v. Ash analysis. The majority claimed that
its inquiry was different from deciding whether to imply a private right
of action. 2 The dissenting Justices disagreed in part, noting the overlap
between the criteria for determining whether a statutory provision
confers a right and the first Cort v. Ash criterion. 243 Closer examination,
however, reveals that the majority's analysis actually overlaps with the
first three Cort criteria.
In Wilder, a Virginia health care provider brought a § 1983 suit
against state officials claiming that Virginia's reimbursement plan
violated a provision of the federal Medicaid Act requiring payment rates
that "are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be
incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities.",2' The
plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief requiring defendants to
promulgate a new state plan and to provide interim rates commensurate
with payments under the Medicare program.245 The defendants argued
the Act did not create any enforceable rights and Congress had
foreclosed enforcement of the Act under § 1983.2"
To evaluate the defendant's first argument, the Court used the three-
part test articulated in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
Angeles;247 namely, whether Congress intended the provision to benefit
someone like the plaintiff, whether it is mandatory, as opposed to merely
reflecting a congressional preference, and whether it is too vague and
amorphous for judicial enforcement.248 As the dissent noted, the first of
these questions is very like the first Cort factor: "[I]s the plaintiff 'one of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted'? 249 The
of action "may appear implicitly in the language or structure of the statute, or in the circumstances of
its enactment").
241. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
242. Id. at 508 n.9.
243. Id. at 524-27 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, JJ.).
244. Id. at 502-04.
245. Id. at 504.
246. Id. at 514-22.
247. 493 U.S. 103 (1989).
248. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509.
249. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (quoting Tex. & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39(1916)).
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Court easily concluded that the requirement was met, stating that "[t]here
can be little doubt that health care providers are the intended
beneficiaries" of the provision requiring reasonable and adequate
reimbursement rates. °
The second Golden State question-whether the provision is
mandatory or merely reflects a congressional preference-overlaps the
second Cort inquiry: "[I-s there any indication of legislative intent,
explicit or implicit, either to create [a private] remedy or to deny one?" '
If the provision is mandatory, that means the state must comply, which in
turn suggests that the provision should be enforceable. The Court read
the statutory language as saying the state reimbursement plan "must"
provide for rates of payment that are reasonable and adequate as "a
congressional command." ' 2 While this command need not necessarily be
enforceable by a private lawsuit, the fact that Congress made the
provision mandatory clearly is relevant to deciding whether there is "any
indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit," to create a private
remedy. 3 Plainly, the Court's inquiry into whether the provision was
mandatory overlaps substantially with the second Cort question.
Finally, whether a private remedy was foreclosed by the existence of
a comprehensive enforcement scheme overlaps the third Cort question:
"[I]s it consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme
to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?" The Wilder Court noted the
Medicaid Act contains few enforcement provisions."' The Secretary of
Health and Human Services can withhold approval of state plans or
withhold federal funds from states whose plans do not comply with the
Act. 6 Because the amendments to the Act were intended to provide
even less oversight by the Secretary, 7 the existence of a private judicial
remedy for health care providers clearly was consistent with Congress's
250. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 510.
251. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
252. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 512. The Court rejected defendant's argument that the statute only
required the state to make findings and give assurances its rates are reasonable and adequate and did
not require the state to adopt rates that actually are reasonable and adequate. Id. at 513-15.
253. The Court also cited additional evidence of congressional intent to allow private enforcement
of the provision. The current provision amended an earlier one that allowed health care providers to
sue in federal court for injunctive relief to ensure that they were reimbursed according to reasonable
and adequate rates. Id at 516. During debate on the amendment, legislators stated that it should not
be construed to limit the rights of health care providers to seek injunctive relief in federal or state
court. Id. at 517.
254. Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.
255. Wilder, 496 U.S. at 521.
256. Id
257. Id. at 522.
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intent to require states to reimburse them at reasonable and adequate
rates. How else could the requirement be enforced? Indeed, although the
Court does not say so, the existence of the private remedy is probably
necessary to effectuate the underlying congressional purpose. In sum,
although the Court purported to talk only about whether the statute
confers a right and whether the private remedy the plaintiff sought was
foreclosed by the existence of a comprehensive remedial scheme, the
discussion is very similar to a Cort v. Ash analysis.
The Court's separate treatment of rights, rights of action, and
remedies sometimes leads it to misstate what it is doing. For example, in
Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District258 and Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education,259 the two recent Title IX sexual
harassment decisions,26° the Court purports only to delimit the remedy
that a student can obtain from a school district,26' but in fact it also
circumscribes students' rights and rights of action under Title IX.
Students do not have a general right to be free of sexual harassment at
school because the Court imposes several conditions on recovery. Gebser
holds that a damage remedy may not be recovered from a school district
for sexual harassment of a student by a teacher unless a school district
official with authority to intervene has actual notice of the teacher's
misconduct and does nothing. 26 Davis also imposes an "actual notice-
deliberate indifference" condition on recovery for student-on-student
harassment, along with the further conditions that the district have
"substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which
the.., harassment occurs"263 and that the harassment be so severe as to
deny the victim equal access to school programs. 26 A school district has
a duty to protect students from sexual harassment only if these conditions
are satisfied. If these conditions are not satisfied, the school district has
no duty and the students have no right to be protected. If students have
no right and no remedy, the Title IX implied right of action is of no
use.265 Because the decisions in Gebser and Davis so plainly affect
258. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
259. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
260. These decisions are discussed supra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
261. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 639 ("[A]t issue here is the question whether a recipient of federal
education funding may be liable for damages under Title IX under any circumstances for
discrimination in the form of student-on-student sexual harassment."); Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284
("[W]e have a measure of latitude to shape a sensible remedial scheme . .
262. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277, 290-91.
263. Davis, 526 U.S. at 645-47.
264. Id. at 633, 650.
265. Ms. Gebser's complaint did not allege actual knowledge of harassment by school officials.
Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278-79. Consequently, she had no right against the school district to be free of
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students' rights and rights of action, it is very misleading for the Court to
contend that it is only addressing the scope of the damage remedy.
B. Two Models Governing Judicial Enforcement ofFederal Statutes
Rights, rights of action, and remedies cannot be separated. When a
court makes a decision about one of them it necessarily affects the other
two. The Court's attempt to separate the inseparable has caused
confusion, distortion, and misstatement. The Court could integrate rights,
rights of action, and remedies if it used one test for deciding whether a
federal statutory provision should be judicially enforceable. To assist in
framing a test, this section presents the adversarial and cooperative
models for the judicial enforcement of federal statutes.
1. The Adversarial Model
The basic premise of the adversarial model is that the federal courts
should play a limited role in the interpretation and implementation of
federal legislation. The federal courts should not invade state
prerogatives or perform legislative functions. As Justice Powell stated in
Cannon v. University of Chicago,2" "[t]he dangers posed by judicial
arrogation of the right to resolve general societal conflicts have been
manifest to this Court throughout its history."267 The federal courts must
be modest, cautious, and even passive.
Why then is this model called "adversarial?" This term is used
because the attitudes of some who support this model are not actually
passive but instead are passive-aggressive.2 68 U.S. Supreme Court
that harassment, and her implied right of action under Title IX was entirely disabled. Ms. Davis's
complaint probably could survive the "substantial control," "actual knowledge," and "deliberate
indifference" requirements because the harassment occurred at school. Ms. Davis's mother
complained repeatedly to school officials, and they failed to take any action. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633-
35. It is unclear whether the harassment she alleged was so severe and pervasive that it barred her
access to school. Id. at 635-36. If it was not, then she too had no right against the district to be free
of that harassment, and her implied right of action was of no use.
266. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
267. Id. at 744 (Powell, J., dissenting).
268. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1199, 1230 ("[The formalist thesis [that federal
courts must have some textual warrant, constitutional or statutory, for adding new remedies to
administrative systems] denies the respect for the sovereign lawgiver upon which it is supposedly
based and is thus internally inconsistent"). Lack of respect for the legislatures is not new. See, e.g.,
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REv. 383, 383 (1908) ("Not the least
notable characteristics of American law today are the excessive output of legislation in all our
jurisdictions and the indifference, if not contempt, with which that output is regarded by courts and
lawyers.).
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Justices sometimes reveal their resentment of Congress. In Middlesex
County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass "n,269 Justice
Stevens admitted that "a Court that is properly concerned about the
burdens imposed upon the federal judiciary, the quality of the work
product of Congress, and the sheer bulk of new federal legislation, has
been more and more reluctant to open the courthouse door to the injured
citizen."27 Justice Powell believed that the Cort v. Ash test encouraged
Congress to be irresponsible: "Congress is encouraged to shirk its
constitutional obligation and leave the issue to the courts to decide.
When this happens, the legislative process with its public scrutiny and
participation has been bypassed, with attendant prejudice to everyone
concerned.,
271
Proponents of the adversarial model seek to shift decision-making
responsibility back to Congress. They believe that if Congress wants a
statute to confer a right, create a cause of action, or provide a remedy, it
must say so expressly, fully, and unambiguously. 22 Moreover, the Court
recently has made plain that if legislation is vague or incomplete, it is
Congress's job to fix it, not the Court's. As then-Justice Rehnquist put it
269. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
270. Id. at 24-25 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); see also Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 374 (1982) ("Our approach to the task
of determining whether Congress intended to authorize a private cause of action has changed
significantly, much as the quality and quantity of federal legislation has undergone significant
change.").
271. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 743 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting). Hans Linde suggests that crass
political maneuvering may underlie a legislative decision to define rights with vague and amorphous
language and to omit express rights of action and remedies from a statute:
(As to] social legislation that places the burden of progress on those whom it regulates, a very
low prospect of effectiveness may be the sine qua non of winning enactment of the law at
all.... Contrary to the instrumentalist canon, the ineffectiveness of a law to achieve its goal
may be itself a policy, a policy shared by the act's opponents and some of its supporters, and
may be the price for permitting the law to reach enactment....
People have reasons for wanting a law, and the lawmaker will see a value in meeting their
wishes, quite apart from any practical good it may do.
Hans A. Linde, Due Process ofLawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197,233 (1976).
272. See, e.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 357-60 (1992) (holding that Congress did not
unambiguously confer on child beneficiaries of Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980
right to enforce requirement that state make "reasonable efforts" to prevent child from being
removed from his family, and once removed, to reunify him with his family); Pennhurst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18-19, 24-25 (1981) (holding that Bill of Rights provision of
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975 did not confer right on
Pennhurst residents to "appropriate treatment" in "least restrictive" setting because Congress listed
this "right" as "finding" and because phrases are too ambiguous to impose specific obligations).
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in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington,T h the Court should not attempt to
"improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into law."274
While it thus is appropriate to call this model "adversarial," I do not
mean to suggest that proponents of the adversarial model are
unprincipled. To the contrary, several weighty arguments support their
stance. Separation-of-powers principles preclude the federal courts from
assuming legislative functions. It is not proper for the Court to transform
aspirational provisions of statutes into mandatory provisions, thereby
creating rights that Congress did not create. As the Court stated in
Rosado v. Wyman,275 "Congress sometimes legislates by innuendo,
making declarations of policy and indicating a preference while requiring
measures that, though falling short of legislating its goals, serve as a
nudge in the preferred directions."
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Similarly, Justice Powell argued eloquently in Cannon v. University
of Chicago2" that judicial creation of a cause of action violated
separation-of-powers principles. He believed that in addition to encour-
aging Congress to act irresponsibly, the Cort test "too easily may be used
to deflect inquiry away from the intent of Congress, and to permit a court
instead to substitute its own views as to the desirability of private
enforcement." '278 In addition, he argued that "[d]etermining whether a
private action would be consistent with the 'underlying purposes' of a
legislative scheme permits a court to decide for itself what the goals of a
scheme should be, and how those goals should be advanced." '79
According to this view, Congress knows how to create private rights of
action explicitly when it wants to, and the Court should not take over the
legislative role.28° Moreover, when a statute provides some remedies,
courts should be 'chary of reading others into it."'
28
'
273. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
274. Id. at 578; accord Univs. Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754, 770 (1981).
275. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
276. Id. at 413.
277. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
278. Id. at 740 (Powell, J., dissenting).
279. l (Powell, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988),
Justice Scalia stated in his concurring opinion that it was "dangerous to assume that, even with the
utmost self-discipline, judges can prevent the implications they see from mirroring the policies they
favor."
280. Cf Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche
Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560,572 (1979).
281. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 147 (1985) (quoting Transamerica, 444
U.S. at 19); see also Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 94 n.30 (1981)
("'A frequently stated principle of statutory construction is that when legislation expressly provides
a particular remedy or remedies, courts should not expand the coverage of the statute to subsume
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Proponents of the adversarial model also rely on principles of
federalism. Modem federal legislation often regulates matters that
traditionally were left to the states. Congress does not usually preempt
state law, but instead legislates against the backdrop of state law.
Reading federal statutes liberally to maximize the creation of rights,
rights of action, and remedies may invade state prerogatives in ways that
Congress did not intend.282 In many instances state remedies are available
to cure wrongdoing and federal remedies are unnecessary. Federalism
concerns are particularly important when plaintiffs sue state and local
government. The Spending Clause cases that require Congress to use
clear and unambiguous language when it imposes conditions on the grant
of federal moneys to states283 protect the states from unexpected federal
intrusion and control.
Some proponents of the adversarial model believe that Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins284 and its progeny limit the power of the federal courts
to create private remedies for violations of federal statutes. Erie, of
course, explicitly restricted the power of the federal courts to declare
rules of general common law.285 Consequently, while it may have been
permissible in the freewheeling days before 1938 to create causes of
action and use any available remedy to redress a wrong, such practices
are improper today.286
Several pragmatic arguments also support the adversarial model.
Congress's lawmaking powers are superior to those of the courts because
it can gather facts, set priorities, and accommodate different viewpoints
in providing rights, rights of action, and remedies.287 Congress can
other remedies.") (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Nat'l Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S.
453,458 (1974)).
282. See, e.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 541 (1984) ("[A] corporation's
rights against its directors or third parties with whom it has contracted are generally governed by
state, not federal, law.'); Cori v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) ("Corporations are creatures of state
law, and investors commit their funds to corporate directors on the understanding that, except where
federal law expressly requires certain responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state
law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation.').
283. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
284. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
285. Id. at 78.
286. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 401 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 36-38 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).
287. See Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 647 (1981) (noting that
legislative bodies can provide "'the kind of investigation, examination, and study that courts
cannot,"' and that legislative process "'involves the balancing of competing values and interests,
which in our democratic system is the business of elected representatives."' (quoting Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 317 (1980)).
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legislate prospectively and comprehensively, and can create adminis-
trative agencies to implement legislation. Courts, by contrast, lack the
"self-starting investigatory and analytical capacities" needed to address
broad social and economic problems, and are unable to ensure that
enforcement will be centralized and coordinated.288 In addition, the
complexity of modem legislation requires greater reliance on
Congress.289 Intricate policy calculations may be necessary to adjust and
coordinate enforcement of complex legislation, and judicial creation of
additional causes of action or remedies may disrupt a delicate balance.29
Thus, when a statute contains a comprehensive remedial scheme
including an integrated set of enforcement mechanisms, a court should
presume that Congress deliberately omitted any additional remedies.29' A
court should not imply any additional private rights of action, grant
additional remedies not specifically authorized by the statute,292 or allow
plaintiff to rely on § 1983 or other general causes of action that may exist
outside the statute itself.293 Finally, and of ever-increasing importance,
288. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1208-09; see also Carlson, 446 U.S. at 36
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Judge Henry J. Friendly once summarized a legislature's advantages in
making law:
Mhe legislature's superior resources for fact gathering; its ability to act without awaiting an
adventitious concatenation of the determined party, the right set of facts, the persuasive lawyer,
and the perceptive court; its power to frame pragmatic rules departing from strict logic, and to
fashion a broad new regime or to bring new facts within an existing one; its practice of changing
law solely for the future in contrast to the general judicial reluctance so to proceed; and, finally,
the greater assurance that a legislative solution is not likely to run counter to the popular will: all
these give the legislature a position of decided advantage, if only it will use it.
Henry J. Friendly, The Gap in Law-Making-Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won "1, 63
COLUM. L. REV. 787, 791-92 (1963) (footnotes omitted).
289. See Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 646 (noting that "range of factors to be weighed in
deciding whether a right to contribution should exist demonstrates the inappropriateness of judicial
resolution of this complex issue"); see also Men-ell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804,
811-12 (1986); Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377.
290. See Frankel, supra note 6, at 570-84 (arguing that private compensatory actions are ill-suited
to deterrence system of securities laws and may hamper central purposes of those statutes); Stewart
& Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1206-07 (arguing that judicial creation of private rights of action may
usurp administrative agency's responsibility for enforcement of statute and decrease legislative
control over enforcement activity).
291. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 97 (1981) ("The
presumption that a remedy was deliberately omitted from a statute is strongest when Congress has
enacted a comprehensive legislative scheme including an integrated system of procedures for
enforcement."); see also Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 645 (same).
292 See Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 146 (1985) (stating that "six carefully
integrated civil enforcement provisions" of statute "provide strong evidence that Congress did not
intend to authorize other remedies that it simply forgot to incorporate").
293. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1011 (1984). The Court stated:
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tighter standards would help reduce the flood of cases to the federal
courts.
294
2. The Cooperative Model
The basic premise of the cooperative model is that the federal courts
should play a constructive and supportive role in interpreting and
implementing federal legislation. Proponents of this model view the
drafting, enactment, interpretation, and implementation of legislation as a
single, ongoing process. All actors in this process, whether legislative,
administrative, or judicial, must work together to help achieve the
underlying goals of federal statutes. The process should not be a
minefield where judges wait to pounce on legislators' missteps,
omissions, or vague language to nullify statutory provisions. 95 Instead,
the federal courts should construe and enforce federal law to protect
basic personal fights and help ensure that government benefits and
entitlements are distributed in a fair, timely, and complete manner. The
cooperative model embraces the traditional equating of rights and
remedies. Proponents believe the federal courts' role "is to ensure
completeness and consistency in the whole fabric of the law, including
those legal norms established through regulatory schemes. 29 6
Proponents of the cooperative model disagree with proponents of the
adversarial model about separation-of-powers and federalism principles.
Separation-of-powers principles do not preclude a federal court from
reading a statutory provision to entitle a plaintiff to the remedy sought,
even if the provision does not confer a right on the plaintiff with crystal
clarity or expressly designate the appropriate remedy. 97 Under the
In light of the comprehensive nature of the procedures and guarantees set out in the [Education
of the Handicapped Act] ... we find it difficult to believe that Congress also meant to leave
undisturbed the ability of a handicapped child to go directly to [federal] court with an equal
protection claim to a free appropriate public education.
Id.; see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. Nat'l Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 21 (198 1)
(concluding that comprehensiveness of remedies provided "demonstrates not only that Congress
intended to foreclose implied private actions but also that it intended to supplant any remedy that
otherwise would be available under § 1983").
294. See Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 811-12; Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 377.
295. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1230-31 ("Ifajudge insists that the sovereign use a
particular verbal formula to confer authority, he restricts the sovereign's lawmaking authority by
precluding other approaches, such as reliance on background understandings.") (footnote omitted).
296. Id. at 1228.
297. See Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 375-76 ("Because the Rigsby approach has prevailed
throughout most of our history, there is no merit to the argument... that judicial recognition of an
implied remedy violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.") (footnote omitted).
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traditional standards, federal courts performed precisely this role from
the founding of the Republic until the early 1970s. 29  The founders
recognized that separation of powers could not be rigid or absolute.
Instead, they considered some blending of powers as necessary for
effective government.2 Congress cannot see all of the situations to
which a law may apply. Therefore, the federal courts must be free to fill
statutory interstices to ensure completeness of consistency in federal law
and to provide appropriate remedies."c This exercise of judicial power is
not a usurpation of legislative authority, but rather is a necessary
supplement to it.30' Finally, if Congress believes that the courts have
made a serious error in interpreting a federal statute, Congress can amend
it.302
Proponents of the cooperative model do not believe that principles of
federalism preclude a federal court from playing a constructive and
supportive role in interpreting and implementing federal legislation. 03
Federal-state relations are involved only peripherally in the relationship
between two branches of the federal government. It does not follow from
the fact that Congress usually legislates against the backdrop of state law
that Congress does not want federal statutes liberally and beneficially
298. See supra Part IA.
299. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) ("While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."); JAMES 0. FREEDMAN,
CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 18 (1978) (explaining that separation of powers has "not preclude[d] one
branch of government from participating in functions assigned primarily to another").
300. See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice ofNational and State Rulesfor Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 797, 800 (1957) ("[S]eparation
of powers cannot be watertight; exclusive reliance upon statutory provision for the solution of all
problems is futile."); The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, 94 HARV. L. REv. 77, 287 (1980)
("[A]llowing courts to resolve the private liability question requires neither unusual nor
undemocratic exercises of judicial power and, within limits, reflects a sensible allocation of
functions between the judiciary and the legislature."); see also Brown, supra note 79, at 623-25;
Linda Sheryl Greene, Judicial Implication of Remedies for Federal Statutory Violations: The
Separation ofPowers Concerns, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 469,487-89 (1980).
301. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1228-31; Albert Tate, Jr., The Law-Making
Function of the Judge, 28 LA. L. REV. 211,222 (1968).
302. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER 97 (1980); Harlan Fiske Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV.
L. REV. 9 (1936).
303. See Zeigler, supra note 6, at 720 (noting that traditional criteria for formulating remedies
"allow a sympathetic, cooperative effort by the courts to work with Congress in effectuating
underlying congressional purposes and goals").
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construed to achieve its goals. Moreover, state law often does not
provide adequate remedies."'
For somewhat similar reasons, proponents of the cooperative model
believe that the Erie doctrine is almost irrelevant to the question of
whether a federal statutory provision entitles a plaintiff to the federal
judicial remedy the plaintiff seeks.0 5 The Erie doctrine addresses the
question of whether federal or state law should apply in a federal lawsuit
and has little to do with the relations between the federal courts and
Congress."e The federal courts may not create general federal common
law in areas constitutionally left to state control, but the federal courts
plainly may create specific common law in areas properly within federal
cognizance.' °7 As Paul J. Mishkin stated, "At the very least, effective
Constitutionalism requires recognition of power in the federal courts to
declare, as a matter of common law or 'judicial legislation,' rules which
may be necessary to fill in interstitially or otherwise effectuate the
statutory patterns enacted in the large by Congress. 3 8
Proponents of the cooperative model also reject many of the
pragmatic arguments put forth to support limiting the role of the federal
courts in interpreting and enforcing statutes. Congress plainly is better
situated than the courts to make law, but this argument misses the point.
A court does not legislate at large when it decides to enforce a specific
statutory provision. Instead, its discretion is channeled and hedged about
on all sides by Congress's words. At this stage of the law making and
enforcing process, a court's perspective often will be superior. Congress
cannot anticipate all of the situations to which a law may apply, and thus
it cannot always specify in advance the precise remedy that justice
requires.30 9 A court, by contrast, can assess the actual effectiveness of the
304. See, e.g., Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,301 n.11 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (responding to majority's suggestion that plaintiff may have right of recovery against
school district as matter of state law by noting that state law immunizes school district from
liability).
305. See Brown, supra note 79, at 622-27; Foy, supra note 6, at 583 ("Nor does the doctrine of
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins have anything to do with the question of implied private remedies.");
Frankel, supra note 6, at 563-66; Hazen, supra note 6, at 1375-82.
306. See generally Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
307. See D'Oench Duhme & Co. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 469-70 (1942)
(Jackson, J., concurring); see generally Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New
Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
308. Mishkin, supra note 300, at 799-800.
309. See Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading ofStatutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
529 (1947) ("The intrinsic difficulties of language and the emergence after enactment of situations
not anticipated by the most gifted legislative imagination, reveal doubts and ambiguities in statutes
that compel judicial construction.'); Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1229 ("It is a
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remedies expressly authorized by Congress1 ° and decide whether
granting the remedy plaintiff seeks would foster or frustrate congres-
sional purposes. Thus, when faced with the question whether the federal
statutory provision the plaintiff relies on creates an entitlement to the
judicial remedy sought, courts should ask whether Congress, if it had
considered this specific situation, would have said "aye" or "nay. 311
Courts also should not be overly concerned about upsetting the
delicate balance of statutory enforcement provisions. Deciding whether a
particular statutory provision confers an enforceable right on the plaintiff
is not intrinsically more difficult than other tasks courts routinely
undertake."' A court can delve as deeply as necessary into legislative
history to determine whether granting plaintiff the remedy sought will
seriously interfere with congressional purposes. Moreover, many
statutory-enforcement mechanisms are neither comprehensive nor finely
tuned. Congress often leaves a great deal of discretion to adminis-
trative agencies in selecting sanctions because the legislators cannot
anticipate the exact activity that should be proscribed.31 4 Thus, the fact
that Congress expressly authorizes remedies for violation of some
statutory provisions should not deter a court from granting a remedy for
violation of another provision.1 5 Finally, if the workload of the federal
courts is too heavy, there are better ways to deal with the problem than
by denying relief to people who otherwise deserve it.
I. A PROPOSED NEW STANDARD AND ITS APPLICATION
Proponents of the "pure"' version of each model are not likely to
agree on a test for deciding whether a statutory provision should be
judicially enforceable. Advocates of the adversarial model would likely
favor a standard that combined Justice Scalia's position in Thompson v.
commonplace that a lawmaker cannot anticipate all of the situations to which a law may be applied;
as a result, he cannot specify in advance the legal consequences of all future events.").
310. See Comment, Private Rights of Action under Amtrak and Ash: Some Implications for
Implication, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1392, 1393 (1975).
311. Some scholars assert that the tenets of the adversarial model would improperly keep a court
from supplementing a remedial scheme that proves inadequate to accomplish clear congressional
purposes. See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 6, at 566.
312. See The Supreme Court, 1979 Term, supra note 300, at 287.
313. See, e.g., Wilder v. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 520-24 (1990) (concluding that
Medicaid Act does not contain comprehensive remedial scheme); Wright v. Roanoke Redev. &
Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 424 (1987) (concluding that Housing Act does not provide
comprehensive remedies).
314. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1290.
315. See Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 711 (1979).
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Thompson316-no more implied rights of action-and a clear-statement
rule requiring Congress to confer rights and authorize remedies in
express, unambiguous terms. Advocates of the cooperative model, by
contrast, would probably favor a return to the traditional standards that
granted any available judicial remedy for a statutory violation as long as
the statute was intended for the benefit of the class of persons of which
the plaintiff was a member and the harm suffered was of a kind that the
statute generally was intended to prevent. 17
Neither course is appropriate. It is impractical to return to the
traditional standards. While "[flew principles of the American
constitutional tradition resonate more strongly than ... for every
violation of a right, there must be a remedy,"3 ' the principle states an
ideal that was never fully achieved" 9 and cannot be today.320 In addition,
today Congress enacts an enormous amount of legislation, much of it
vague, sprawling, and amorphous. It no longer seems workable to allow
people to sue to enforce any provision of a federal statute that arguably is
intended for their benefit. Nor, on the other hand, should courts adopt the
overly restrictive standards suggested by the adversarial model. Even if
legislators could write with perfect clarity, they simply cannot anticipate
all of the situations to which their words may apply. Thus, the restrictive
standards place an unrealistic responsibility on Congress and unfairly
disadvantage those whom Congress seeks to help by legislating.
Instead, the courts should chart a middle course between these two
extremes. The test should incorporate the generous, constructive
impulses of the cooperative model and the cautionary concerns of the
adversarial model. Courts may properly play a cooperative and
supportive role in implementing federal legislation. A majority of the
Justices have rejected the arguments that separation-of-powers principles
and the Erie doctrine prohibit a federal court from implying a private
right of action from a federal statute or granting a damage remedy to
316. 484 U.S. 174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[W]e should get out of the business of
implied rights of action altogether.").
317. See supra Part I.A.
318. Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1778.
319. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
320. See DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 50 (1990) ("[I]t is
probably more accurate to say that where there's a right, there may be many remedies, or none.") If
there is no remedy, of course, what Professor Schoenbrod, et alia, call a "right" is only a hope or a
wish. See also Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1777 ("[N]ot every violation of constitutional
rights is centrally relevant to the question of enforceable duties for which the jurisdiction of an
enforcement court is invoked."); Zeigler, supra note 6, at 680-81 (suggesting many practical reasons
why "rights" cannot have remedies).
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enforce an existing cause of action.32' Courts should work with Congress
to try to achieve the underlying goals of federal statutes. At the same
time, courts should be sensitive to the pragmatic concerns of proponents
of the adversarial model. They should not seek to convert every vague,
aspirational provision of a federal statute into a font of enforceable
rights. They should carefully examine how the remedy the plaintiff seeks
would fit into the overall remedial scheme of the statute to ensure that
the litigation does not undercut Congress's purposes. They should also
consider whether the plaintiff's lawsuit will be manageable and whether
it might lead to a flood of similar cases.
Courts should not take any part of the rights-remedies equation as a
given in deciding whether the federal statutory provision the plaintiff
relies on entitles the plaintiff to the judicial remedy he or she seeks. It is
not helpful to assume a priori that the right, the right of action, or the
remedy is secure, and then to focus only on the remaining elements. This
sort of assumption is misleading, as demonstrated above.3" Because
rights, rights of action, and remedies cannot be separated, a decision
concerning one of them necessarily affects the other two. Thus, there is
simply no point in pretending that one or more elements of the rights-
remedies equation is secure in any lawsuit where an element is in play.
Because the elements are interrelated, the separate criteria developed
by the Court for assessing each element are not sufficient to answer the
overarching question of whether the statutory provision on which a
plaintiff relies creates the rights and duties claimed and entitles the
plaintiff to the particular remedy sought. The three-part Golden State test
for deciding whether a statute confers a right cannot alone answer
whether Congress wanted a person such as this plaintiff to be able to
enforce the right or to obtain a particular remedy. The Touche Ross-
Transanerica test, which uses only the second Cort factor" to decide
321. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 73-74 (1992) (rejecting argument
that separation-of-powers principles prohibit "the authority to award appropriate relief"); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 375-76 (1982) ("Because the Rigsby
approach prevailed throughout most of our history, there is no merit to the argument advanced by
petitioners that the judicial recognition of an implied private remedy violates the separation-of-
powers doctrine."). Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist have stated that implication of a private
right of action violates the Erie doctrine. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14,36-38 (1980) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 732 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) (stating
that Rigsby was decided under regime of Sw fl v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (6 Pet.) 1 (1842), and thus "cannot
be taken as authority for the judicial creation of a cause of action not legislated by Congress").
322. See supra notes 229-65 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 135-36 and accompanying text.
324. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) ("[I]s there any indication of legislative intent, explicit
or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one?').
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whether to create a private right of action, does not work very well in
making that decision, as is shown by the Court's continuing reliance on
the other Cort factors.3 25 Finally, the presumption that where rights have
been invaded and a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case, all
appropriate remedies are available to make good the wrong done,3 26 does
not help a court decide whether the statutory provision in question
actually confers the right the plaintiff claims or whether Congress would
want this plaintiff to obtain the specific remedy sought.
What is needed in place of these tests is a single, integrated test. This
Article suggests taking parts of all of the tests and combining them in a
new way that will allow the courts to play a cooperative, positive role in
interpreting and enforcing federal legislation while avoiding the pitfalls
identified by proponents of the adversarial model. The proposed test is
more an analytic process than a set of fixed criteria. The test has several
steps that focus on key questions and consider important cautionary
factors.327 The steps are set forth below.
A. The Language of the Statute
Courts routinely begin with the statutory language when interpreting
a statute,328 and the actual words are a logical starting point in this
context as well.329 The plaintiff claims the defendant violated a right
325. See supra notes 230-240 and accompanying text.
326. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 66 (1992); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S.
678, 684 (1946).
327. Preliminarily, remember that the analysis that follows is necessary only in cases where the
statutory provision fails expressly to provide one or more of the three elements. If the provision
clearly confers a right on the plaintiff, specifically creates a cause of action, and authorizes the exact
remedy the plaintiff seeks, then the court should simply proceed to determine whether the plaintiff
can prove the case.
328. E.g., W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 98 (1991) ("The best evidence of
[Congress's] purpose is the statutory text adopted by both Houses of Congress and submitted to the
President."); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990) ("The starting
point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself."') (quoting Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980)); United States v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 542 (1940) ("[T]he function of the courts is ... to construe the language so as
to give effect to the intent of Congress.").
329. The Court has routinely begun its inquiry with the language of the statute in implied right of
action cases. E.g., Daily Income Fund, Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 534 (1984) ("In determining
whether § 36(b) confers a right that could be judicially enforced by an investment company, we look
first, of course, at the language of the statute."); Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. It, 15 (1979) ("[W]e begin with the language of the statute itself.'); Touche Ross & Co. v.
Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1979) ("[O]ur analysis must begin with the language of the
statute."). And in cases in the Thiboutot line, the Court inquires whether a statutory provision confers
a right on the plaintiff. E.g., Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 358-60 (1992) (examining statutory
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granted by a particular federal statutory provision. What does the
provision say? Is there a clear and logical fit between the language and
the defendant's conduct? In other words, does it expressly or specifically
prohibit the defendant from doing what he has done or require him to do
something he has failed to do?33° In addition, does the provision appear
to have been enacted to protect someone like the plaintiff? The standard
for evaluating statutory language suggested in Cannon v. University of
Chicago331 is helpful. Does "the language of the statute explicitly
conferl a right directly on the class of persons that includeo the plaintiff
in the case," or does it only "create duties on the part of persons for the
benefit of the public at large"?332 Congress is more likely to have
intended the provision to be enforced in a private suit by plaintiff in the
former instance than in the latter.
The first Cort criteria--"Is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose
especial benefit the statute was enacted'? 333 -is too restrictive in one
way and not restrictive enough in another. Use of the word "especial"
suggests that a statute cannot confer enforceable rights on several groups
of people in the same statutory provision. This reading is too restrictive.
Congress can confer rights of primary and secondary importance in one
provision and still intend that they all be enforced. If plaintiff can only
show that he is a part of the class for whose secondary benefit the statute
was enacted, that should not automatically disqualify him from enforcing
the provision. In Cort itself, the Court denied a private right of action to
stockholders under a federal criminal provision prohibiting corporations
from making contributions to candidates in presidential elections because
the provision's primary purpose was to benefit the public at large by
freeing elections from the power of corporate money, while protecting
stockholders' interests in seeing that corporate funds were not given to
candidates whom they did not support "was at best a secondary
concern."334 It is not clear why Congress's desire to protect stockholders
did not support implication of a private right of action on their behalf.
language to decide whether Congress in enacting Adoption Act unambiguously conferred certain
rights upon children); Wilderv. Va. Hasp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498,509-16 (1990) (examining statutory
language while applying three-part Golden State test).
330. If the answer to either of these questions is a clear no, the case is at an end. E.g., Central
Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 177 (1992) (noting
that absence of text in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposing duty to refrain from aiding and
abetting § 10(b) violation "resolves the case").
331. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
332 Id. at 690-92&n.13.
333. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (quoting Tex. & Pao. R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33,
39(1916)).
334. Id. at 8 I.
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The first Cort factor also is not restrictive enough because it does not
specifically require that the provision be mandatory rather than
precatory. This requirement, which is borrowed from the Golden State
test, is important. In enacting social legislation, Congress often begins
with a lengthy policy statement explaining why the legislation is needed
and what it is intended to accomplish.335 Such provisions often are only
statements of aspirations written to introduce the legislation and to make
Congress look good. While such provisions may indicate that the statute
was enacted for the benefit of a particular group, Congress may not have
intended that these general provisions be judicially enforceable.
Professor Henry Monaghan suggests that the Golden State test
distinguishes "between those who are 'incidental' beneficiaries of federal
programs imposing duties and those who are intentionally protected." '336
The especial benefit language of Cort may be intended to make this
distinction as well. If Congress intended to benefit a group of which
plaintiff is a member, even though this group is only the secondary or
tertiary beneficiary of the provision, then courts should probably grant
plaintiff a remedy. On the other hand, if Congress truly did not intend to
benefit the group and the seeming benefit the plaintiff claims results
from careless or imprecise drafting, a court probably should not grant
relief. The problem, of course, is deciding where to draw the line.
Some examples help illustrate the distinction and the difficulty in
drawing the line. In Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Russell,337 the plaintiff was a beneficiary under two employee benefit
plans administered by Massachusetts Mutual.33 She alleged that the
fiduciaries administering the plans improperly cut off her benefits for a
back ailment and violated federal regulations by taking 132 days to
process her claim.339 Although plaintiffs benefits were restored and full
retroactive benefits were paid, she sued for the financial losses suffered
because her disabled husband was forced to cash out a retirement plan to
tide them over and for psychological injury caused by the stress.34
335. See, e.g., Individuals With Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, § 651, 111 Stat. 37, 123-24 (1997) (listing, inter alia, several goals that effective educa-
tional systems must seek to achieve in addressing needs of children with disabilities).
336. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 250.
337. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
338. Id. at 136.
339. Id. at 136-37.
340. Id. at 137.
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The court of appeals held that § 409(a) of the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) entitled plaintiff to relief.341
Section 409(a) reads:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches
any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties imposed upon
fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make good to
such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach,
and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary which have
been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the
court may deem appropriate ... 342
The Court reasoned that the long delay in processing plaintiff's claim
breached defendant's fiduciary duty to process claims in a timely and
diligent manner, that § 409(a) created a cause of action for a plan
beneficiary, and that the language authorizing "such other equitable or
remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate" gave the court wide
discretion in ordering compensatory and punitive damages.343
The U.S. Supreme Court read § 409(a) differently. The Court pointed
out that § 409(a) only requires a fiduciary who breaches his duty "to
make good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such
breach."344 It does not make the fiduciary liable to individual
beneficiaries.3 45 The next clause, which requires the fiduciary to restore
to the plan any profits the fiduciary made through the misuse of plan
assets, suggests that Congress's main goal in writing § 409(a) was to
prevent misuse of plan assets by plan administrators, not to provide
recompense to beneficiaries injured by bureaucratic delays.3" The Court
concluded that the lower court erred in jumping from the opening clause
of § 409(a), which makes a fiduciary personally liable, to the catch-all
remedial clause at the end, "skipping over the intervening language
establishing remedies benefiting, in the first instance, solely the plan
[and] divorc[ing] the phrase being construed from its context and
construct[ing] an entirely new class of relief available to entities other
than the plan. 347
341. Id.
342. Id. at 139.
343. Id. at 137-38.
344. Id. at 139 (emphasis added).
345. See d. at 140.
346. See id. at 142.
347. Id. at 141-42.
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The U.S. Supreme Court probably has the stronger argument, but it is
a close call. Section 409(a) by its terms confers rights on the plan, and
not on individual beneficiaries, and imposes a duty on the fiduciary to
compensate the plan for any breach rather than individuals. In a broader
sense, however, § 409(a) is intended to benefit plan beneficiaries. As the
Court admits, the purpose of § 409(a) is to ensure the plan remains
financially sound and its assets are not stolen or squandered by plan
administrators so that moneys are available for plan beneficiaries."
Indeed, the whole purpose of the plan is to ensure that employees get
disability benefits to which they are entitled when they are entitled to
them.3 49 Thus, in writing § 409(a) Congress intended to benefit the group
of which plaintiff is a member, even if only in a derivative or secondary
way. Arguably, therefore, plaintiff should have been given relief under
the final clause of § 409(a) that makes the defendant "subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate.""35
California v. Sierra Club35' provides another example of the
difficulty in distinguishing between the intentional and incidental
beneficiaries of a statutory provision. In this case the U.S. Supreme
Court interpreted the statute incorrectly and denied a remedy to people
Congress clearly intended to protect. California transported water from
the wetter north to the more arid central and southern parts of the state.352
Fresh water was gathered and stored behind dams and then released as
needed into the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta.353 From there the water
was diverted into canals and aqueducts to carry it south. 354 The fresh
water released into the Delta could be degraded by salt water from the
Pacific, so the state proposed to build a canal that would by-pass the
Delta.355 The Sierra Club, joined by a commercial fisherman and a Delta
landowner, filed suit to stop the state from building the canal. They
alleged that present and proposed diversions of fresh water from the
Delta made the Delta water too salty.356 Plaintiffs claimed that the canal
project would violate their rights under § 10 of the Rivers and Harbors
Act of 1899, which prohibits "[t]he creation of any obstruction not
348. Id. at 142.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 139.
351. 451 U.S. 287 (1981).
352. Id. at 290.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 291.
356. Id. at 292.
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affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the navigable capacity of any of
the waters of the United States ... ."' Section 10 also makes it unlawful
"to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course,
location, condition, or capacity of, any port, roadstead, haven,
harbor, canal, lake, harbor of refuge... or of the channel of any
navigable water of the United States, unless the work has been
recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the
Secretary of the Army. ....,'
The lower courts concluded that plaintiffs could avail themselves of a
private cause of action to enforce § 10." The Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals reasoned that § 10 was "designed for the especial benefit of
private parties who may suffer 'special injury' caused by an unauthorized
obstruction to a navigable waterway. ' 36 The U.S. Supreme Court
disagreed. The Court said the question was not whether plaintiffs would
benefit from enforcement of § 10, "but whether Congress intended to
confer federal rights upon those beneficiaries. 361 In this case, the
language of the Act "states no more than a general proscription of certain
activities; it does not unmistakably focus on any particular class of
beneficiaries whose welfare Congress intended to further. 3 62 Thus,
Congress was not concerned with the rights of individuals but rather with
benefiting the public at large.
The court of appeals has the stronger argument. The statutory
language strongly suggests Congress intended to confer rights on anyone
who was directly harmed by an unauthorized obstruction, and this
certainly includes the plaintiffs. Section 10 states that it is unlawful "to
excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location,
condition, or capacity of, any.., haven, harbor, canal, lake, harbor of
refuge.., or of the channel of any navigable water of the United States"
without the required permission.363 Building a forty-mile canal to divert
large amounts of fresh water would clearly alter the condition or capacity
of the Delta, a navigable water of the United States. Plaintiffs claimed
that this change would cause them measurable harm.3" Plaintiffs thus
357. Id. at 289 n.2.
358. Id. (quoting Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994)).
359. Id. at 292. The court of appeals held that the necessary approvals had been obtained as to one
part of the project. Id.
360. Id. at 293-94.
361. Id. at 294.
362. Id.
363. Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 § 10, 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1994).
364. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 291-92.
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appear to be members of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted. Indeed, people harmed by obstructions or changes in the
condition of navigable waters would seem to be the primary group the
statute was enacted to protect, while members of the general public are
only incidental beneficiaries.
The U.S. Supreme Court stressed that the statute does not expressly
state that § 10 was enacted for the benefit of people harmed by violation
of the provision.36 This distinguished Sierra Club from a case like
Cannon v. University of Chicago,366 where the statute explicitly
identified the intended beneficiaries.367 But it is easy to determine who
Congress intended to protect in § 10. Although Congress did not say
expressly it intended to benefit people harmed by obstructions, its
intentions are clearly and fairly inferable from the statutory language.
Requiring a certain form of words frustrates, rather than furthers,
Congress's intent.368
365. Id. at 294.
366. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
367. Id. at 682 n.3 (discussing statute requiring that "[n]o person ... on the basis of sex [shall]
be... subjected to discrimination under any education program ... receiving federal financial
assistance").
368. In Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992), the Court engaged in a tortured reading of a
statutory provision to deny plaintiffs relief. The plaintiffs' brought a class action against an Illinois
state agency charged with caring for abused and neglected children. They claimed the defendants
were violating a provision of the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980. Id. at 351-52.
The Act was passed pursuant to Congress's spending power and required that to be eligible for
payments, a state "shall have a plan approved by the Secretary." Id. at 351. The statute required,
inter alia, that as of October 1, 1983, the plan provide "in each case, reasonable efforts will be made
(A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of
the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home ... " Id. The
plaintiffs claimed that the agency was failing to comply with this provision because it did not assign
caseworkers promptly to children placed in agency custody. Id. The district court ordered that a
caseworker be assigned within three working days and the court of appeals affirmed. Id. at 353.
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the provision did not unambiguously confer a right
upon children to enforce the "reasonable efforts" language. Id. at 363. The Court admitted that the
language was mandatory, but held that the provision merely required that states have a plan that
provides that reasonable efforts will be made to keep children out of foster care, not that states
actually make reasonable efforts to achieve this goal. Id. at 358. Moreover, the statute gave no
guidance as to how reasonable efforts were to be measured, and thus, the meaning of the directive
would vary from case to case. Id. at 359-60. The Court concluded that the provision imposed "only a
rather generalized duty on the State, to be enforced not by private individuals," but by a cut-off of
federal funds if the state is not complying with its own plan. Id. at 363.
Suter shows the adversarial model operating at its cynical worst. Did Congress really mean to
require only that states have a plan stating that reasonable efforts would be made to keep children
out of foster care, but not mean to require that states actually make those efforts? It seems unlikely
that Congress wanted to make state officials go through the meaningless ritual of writing things
down on a piece of paper that was a dead letter before the ink dried. In addition, the reasonable
efforts standard does not seem any less judicially enforceable than the myriad other statutory and
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B. The Overall Statutory Context
If it is unclear whether the language of the provision that a plaintiff
relies on entitles the plaintiff to the particular remedy sought, a court
should broaden the inquiry beyond that provision. A court should look at
the overall structure and purpose of the statute for guidance. Several
questions are pertinent. Why did Congress enact this statute? What was it
trying to accomplish? What problem was the legislature responding to,
and how did it seek to cure or correct it? What are people required to do
under the law, and what are they forbidden from doing? By answering
these questions, a court can provide a context for interpreting the
provision. It can determine whether granting plaintiff (and others
similarly situated) the remedy sought would be consistent with the
underlying purposes of the statute, or helpful in accomplishing them, or
perhaps even necessary to accomplish them.
The suggestion that courts consider the overall statutory context is
controversial because of the U.S. Supreme Court cases that purport to
reject the third Cort criterion,369 which asks whether it is consistent with
underlying statutory purposes to imply a private right of action for the
plaintiff.37° As explained above, however, the Court often cannot avoid
this inquiry because it needs the information to decide whether the
legislature intended either to create or deny a private right of action.37' In
addition, the Court expressly and routinely considers overall statutory
structure and purpose when it decides whether a statute creates a right or
authorizes a remedy.Y As Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out,
"Because reliance on these background understandings is inevit-
able... [i]n interpreting statutes that are silent on the existence of
private enforcement rights.., such reliance should be viewed as an
established and legitimate device of lawmaking through statutory
construction rather than a controversial intrusion on legislative
prerogatives. ' 3n
common law requirements that people act reasonably. See, e.g., Wilderv. Va. Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S.
498, 519-20 (1990) (finding judicially enforceable statutory requirement that state plan for medical
assistance provide rates of payment that "are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must
be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities"). In sum, the Suter Court went out of
its way to undercut Congress's intent to require that states make reasonable efforts to keep children
out of foster care.
369. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
370. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66,78 (1975).
371. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
372. See infra notes 383-96 and accompanying text.
373. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1231.
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The Court candidly admitted it was considering the underlying
statutory purposes and legislative history in deciding whether to imply a
private right of action in Thompson v. Thompson.374 David and Susan
Thompson engaged in a dispute over custody of their son Matthew that
ended with conflicting orders from courts in Louisiana and California.375
To resolve the impasse, David brought suit in federal court under the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 to determine which state
decree was valid.376 The Act did not explicitly create a private right of
action in favor of a parent, so the Court looked at "the context of the
[Act] with an eye toward determining Congress' perception of the law
that it was shaping or reshaping." '377 Congress passed the statute in
response to a perceived epidemic of parental kidnapping. 378 Because
custody decrees generally are modifiable to further the best interests of
the child, the constitutional and statutory full faith and credit
requirements did not reliably ensure national enforcement of custody
decisions. 379 The Act was passed to make the Full Faith and Credit
Clause more effective in custody cases. 38" Given this focus, the Court
thought it would be incompatible "with the purpose and context of the
legislative scheme" to create a private right of action that would
substitute a federal court determination for state court application of the
enhanced full faith and credit requirements.381 Thus, the Court concluded
that the overall statutory structure and purposes counseled against
creation of a private right of action.382
The U.S. Supreme Court often considers statutory structure and
purpose in deciding whether a statutory provision confers a right. For
example, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau,383 the Court relied on statutory structure and purpose in finding
in a suit brought pursuant to § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission that a
374. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
375. Id. at 178.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 180.
378. Id. at 180-81.
379. Id. at 181.
380. Id. at 181-82.
381. Id. at 183. Moreover, explicit statements in the legislative history indicated that Congress did
not want the federal courts to play the enforcement role that plaintiff sought. Id. at 183-87. Congress
wanted more full faith and credit among state courts and did not want the federal courts "to play
Solomon" where two state courts issued conflicting custody orders. Id. at 186.
382. Id. at 187.
383. 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
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defendant could seek a right to contribution from joint tortfeasors.8 4 The
Court examined two other sections of the Act-§§ 9 and 18-that were
"close in structure, purpose, and intent to the lOb-5 action."385 Both
sections contained an express right to contribution.3"6 The Court
concluded: "We think that these explicit provisions for contribution are
an important, not an inconsequential, feature of the federal securities
laws and that consistency requires us to adopt a like contribution rule for
the right of action existing under Rule lOb-5.
38 7
The Court also routinely relies on overall statutory context in
deciding whether a statute should be read to authorize the remedy the
plaintiff seeks. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District38
and Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,389 the two recent Title
IX sexual harassment cases,3 the Court generally examined Title IX "to
ensure that we do not fashion the parameters of an implied right in a
manner at odds with the statutory structure and purpose."391 In Gebser,
the Court found "important clues" in Title IX's express enforcement
provisions that Congress did not intend to allow a damage remedy where
liability was based on constructive notice or vicarious liability.392 The
express means of enforcement by administrative agencies assumed that
recipients would be on actual notice of violations before any action was
taken because an agency could not initiate enforcement proceedings until
it had notified the recipient of its failure to comply and determined that
compliance could not be achieved by voluntary means.393 Similarly, the
Davis Court looked to Title IX's other prohibitions to help give content
to the term "discrimination" in the sexual harassment context.394 Students
are protected not only from discrimination, but also from being
384. Id. at 288.
385. Id. at 295.
386. Id. at 297.
387. Id. Similarly, in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), the
Court looked beyond the statutory language in deciding that the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA) created rights that forbade the City to condition renewal of petitioner's taxicab franchise on
settlement of a labor dispute between the petitioner and its union. Id. at 104-05. The City argued that
because the duties of government are not expressly set forth in the Act, the Act did not create rights
against the City or the State. Id. at 111. The Court disagreed, stating that the "language, structure,
and history of the NLRA" all show that Congress meant to protect "certain rights of labor and
management against governmental interference." Id.
388. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
389. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
390. See supra notes 180-207 and accompanying text.
391. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284.
392. Id. at 288.
393. Id.
394. Davis, 526 U.S. at 650-51.
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"excluded from participation in" or "denied the benefits of" any program
receiving federal financial assistance.395 Based on these other prohibi-
tions, the Court concluded that sexual harassment amounts to prohibited
discrimination only when it is so severe that students are effectively
denied equal access to school programs.396
As yet another way of examining overall statutory context, courts
sometimes consider which constitutional power Congress used in
enacting the legislation for guidance in interpreting it. As to statutes
enacted pursuant to the spending power, Pennhurst State School &
Hospital v. Halderman397 held that Congress must impose any conditions
on a state accepting federal money in clear and unambiguous language or
the Court will not enforce them.398 While the Pennhurst rule may be
reasonable, in recent years the Court has transformed it into a new
standard that governmental entities receiving federal funds are liable
only for their own knowing and intentional wrongdoing. The Court
signaled the change in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,"
when it stated that Pennhurst "observed that remedies were limited
under... Spending Clause statutes when the alleged violation was
unintentional" because the entity receiving federal funds "lacks notice
that it will be liable for a monetary award."'  The Court applied the new
standard in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,41' holding
that a school district can be liable under Title IX for a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student only when district officials have actual
knowledge of the harassment and are deliberately indifferent to it.
402
Indeed, the rule appears to have taken on a life of its own and is no
longer anchored to the Pennhurst rationale. Saying that a fund recipient
can be held liable only when it is put on clear notice of what it must do if
it takes federal funds is not that same thing as saying that it can be held
liable only for its own intentional wrongdoing. Assume Congress enacts
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. 451 U.S. 1 (1980).
398. Id. at 17. Moreover, a state must be given the option of either assuming the costs of
complying with federal regulations or withdrawing from the program. See Guardians Ass'n v. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 596-97 (1983) (White, J.); see also Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397,
420-21 (1970).
399. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
400. Id. at 74.
401. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
402. Id. at 292. The Court also applied the new standard in Davis v. Monroe County Board of
Education, 526 U.S. 629,640-46 (1999) (holding school district liable underTitle IX forstudent-on-
student sexual harassment only when school officials have actual knowledge of harassment and
deliberately fail to stop it).
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a statute under the spending power that imposes a duty on states to
supervise their employees to ensure they comply with the requirements
of the new law and specifically imposes a respondeat superior standard
of liability on the states for any wrongdoing by an employee. A state
could be held liable for employee misconduct under the original
Pennhurst rule because the states are clearly and unambiguously on
notice of their duties. But states could not be held liable under the later
cases that refuse to grant make-whole remedies except for knowing and
intentional misconduct on the part of the fund recipient itself.
There may be good reasons not to impose liability on state and local
government or supervisory officials for the actions of their subordinates
unless the government or the official authorizes the action or at least
knowingly allows it to continue, °3 despite the fact that such limitations
conflict with normal tort principles of respondeat superior. Holding local
government or government officials liable on a respondeat superior or
constructive-notice basis may conflict with sovereign-immunity
principles or impose unfair burdens on the officials who are often not in
a position to supervise subordinates closely. 4 But these reasons have
little to do with the rationale of the Pennhurst rule that it is unfair to hold
a party to terms of a contract that are unclear or ambiguous. The Court
has gone beyond assessing the statutory context of the provision on
which plaintiff relies to making its own affirmative substantive policy
choices about the scope of liability under statutes enacted pursuant to the
spending power.
In sum, the overall structure and purpose of a statute often are crucial
in determining whether the statutory provision on which a plaintiff relies
creates the rights and duties claimed and entitles the plaintiff to the
particular judicial remedy sought. The U.S. Supreme Court has looked to
the statutory context in determining whether a statutory provision confers
a right, creates a right of action, or authorizes a remedy. Reliance on
these background understandings is a necessary and legitimate device for
403. The Court has imposed such limitations in § 1983 cases. The Court has refused to make
municipalities liable under § 1983 for injuries inflicted by city employees unless they were acting
pursuant to official government policy or custom. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
692-95 (1978). Similarly, the Court has refused to impose § 1983 liability on city officials unless
they affirmatively direct their subordinates to violate citizens' civil rights. See Rizzo v. Goode, 423
U.S. 362,371,376 (1976). As Professors Doemberg and Wingate observe, "[t]he Court's insistence
in Rizzo on a direct, causal connection to establish individual liability compares closely with its
insistence in Monell on finding a municipal statute, ordinance, custom, usage or policy in order to
establish municipal liability:' DONALD L. DOERNBERG & C. KEITH WINGATE, FEDERAL COURTS,
FEDERALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 505-06 (2d ed. 2000).
404. See Scheuerv. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232,246-47 (1974).
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construing unclear or ambiguous statutory provisions. The Court should
continue to look to overall statutory structure and purpose, although it
should be careful not to use the inquiry, as it does in the Spending Clause
cases, as a means to impose its own ideas about the proper scope of
liability.
C. Possible Reasons for Caution
Even if the language of the provision the plaintiff relies on and the
overall statutory structure and purpose strongly support granting the
plaintiff the particular remedy sought, a court should nonetheless
consider several cautionary factors before allowing the case to proceed.
A court should consider whether the action, and others like it, will be
judicially manageable, whether granting a private remedy might interfere
with the remedial scheme that Congress has expressly enacted, and
whether allowing plaintiff to proceed will result in a flood of new
lawsuits. There is, of course, no easy or mechanical way to determine
when one or more of these factors justifies dismissing a lawsuit. But if
federal courts may abstain entirely from hearing actions that Congress
has explicitly directed them to hear,05 surely they may decline for
pragmatic reasons to hear lawsuits that Congress has not explicitly
authorized.
1. Will the Plaintiffs Action, and Others Like It, Be Judicially
Manageable?
An action seeking to enforce a provision of a complex regulatory or
entitlement statute may be unmanageable for several reasons. The action
may simply be too complicated, raising scientific or economic issues that
courts are not well-equipped to resolve.4' 6 These problems may be
particularly acute in class actions. As Professors Stewart and Sunstein
point out, "Not only must the court resolve the question whether a
violation of regulatory requirements occurred, but it also must attempt to
measure the economic impact of noncompliance. In complex areas of
economic regulation, such measurements may approach the
405. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971) (ordering abstention in action seeking to
interfere with pending state criminal prosecution); R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496,
500-01 (1941) (ordering plaintiff to proceed in state court where definitive interpretation of
ambiguous provision of state law may accord plaintiff relief and obviate need to reach federal
constitutional question raised by plaintiffs complaint).
406. See Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1293.
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impossible."4°7 An action also may require a federal court to resolve
sensitive issues of human relations that have traditionally been resolved
in the state courts. In Thompson v. Thompson,"8 for example, the Court
refused to authorize an action under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act of 1980 to determine which of two conflicting state custody
decisions was valid because it did not want the federal judges to become
entangled in state domestic-relations questions "that they have little
expertise to resolve."'4°
An action to enforce a broad statutory provision also may pose
manageability problems if the plaintiff seeks correspondingly broad
injunctive relief that would be very expensive or would involve
substantial restructuring of a government program. Moreover, as
Professors Stewart and Sunstein point out, some "statutory norms that
allow considerable flexibility in regulating conduct" do not create clear
"bipolar right-duty legal relations."' 0 Judicial enforcement is difficult in
such cases unless the parties or the court can redefine and narrow the
lawsuit to make judicial enforcement manageable.
Blessing v. Freestone41' provides a good example of both of these
problems. The case involved Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, a
complex statute that requires a state, in exchange for federal monies, to
"establish a comprehensive system to establish paternity, locate absent
parents, and help families obtain support orders."412 The statute also
requires states to be in "substantial compliance" with its provisions.4"3
Plaintiffs were custodial parents of children eligible to receive child
support services from the State of Arizona under the Title IV-D." a They
claimed the state agency charged with enforcing the statute had not taken
adequate steps to obtain support payments from the fathers of their
children because of "staff shortages, high caseloads, unmanageable
backlogs, and deficiencies in the State's accounting methods and record-
keeping."'"5 The plaintiffs brought a class action on behalf of all children
and custodial parents residing in Arizona who were or would be entitled
to services under Title IV-D seeking a declaratory judgment that the state
was not in "substantial compliance" with the statute and injunctive relief
407. Id.
408. 484 U.S. 174 (1988).
409. Id. at 186.
410. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1305.
411. 520 U.S. 329 (1997).
412. Id. at 333-34.
413. Id. at 335.
414. Id. at 332.
415. Id. at 337.
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requiring affirmative measures to achieve substantial compliance
"throughout all programmatic operations at issue.
"416
The Court initially expressed alarm that the plaintiffs' broadly
worded request for relief "essentially invited the District Court to oversee
every aspect of Arizona's Title IV-D program."417 The Court held the
substantial-compliance provision of Title IV-D did not create a federal
right.418 Instead, it was merely a "yardstick" for the Secretary of Health
and Human Services to use in measuring the system-wide performance
of the State's program.419 The substantial-compliance provision and other
provisions of Title IV-D requiring adequate staffing levels did not give
rise to federal rights because:
[T]he link between increased staffing and the services provided to
any particular individual is far too tenuous to support the notion
that Congress meant to give each and every Arizonan who is
eligible for Title IV-D the right to have the State Department of
Economic Security staffed at a "sufficient" level.
42 °
In Stewart and Sunstein's terms, the statutory provisions plaintiffs relied
on did not "create bipolar right-duty legal relations."' The Court
ultimately remanded the case to the district court to give the plaintiffs an
opportunity to narrow their claims and to identify specifically the rights
they claimed defendants had violated.422
While the decision in Blessing seems correct, courts should not
exaggerate manageability problems. Statutes often contain "reason-
ableness" or "adequacy" standards that may be enforced without getting
a court into a quagmire. For example, in Wright v. Roanoke
Redevelopment & Housing Authority,423 the Court believed that HUD
regulations requiring that a "reasonable" amount for utilities be included
in the rent that a public housing authority could charge was not "beyond
the competence of the judiciary to enforce" because the regulations set
out guidelines for the authority to follow in making utility allowances. 4
Similarly, in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass "n,425 the Court held that a
416. Id.
417. Id. at 341.
418. Id. at 343.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 345.
421. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1305.
422. Freestone, 520 U.S. at 342, 349.
423. 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
424. Id. at 431-32.
425. 496 U.S. 498 (1990).
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statutory provision giving state health care providers a right to a state
medical plan that provided "reasonable and adequate" payment rates
could be manageably enforced because the statute provided the
benchmark of an "efficiently and economically operated facilit[y]" to
help assess rates.426
The Court exaggerated the manageability problems in Suter v.
Artist M. 427 when holding a statutory provision requiring caseworkers to
make "reasonable efforts" to keep children out of foster care could not be
workably enforced because the meaning of the directive would vary from
case to case.428 The district court had entered a carefully limited
injunction requiring only that the state assign a caseworker to each child
placed in state custody within three working days of the time the case
was first heard in juvenile court, and assign a new caseworker to a child
within three working days of the time the original caseworker
relinquished responsibility of the case.429 The efforts a caseworker should
make to keep children with their biological parents were left up to the
Agency and the caseworker. The district court apparently did not plan to
review individual cases to see if efforts to keep children out of foster care
were reasonable or to engage in elaborate, ongoing supervision of the
details of the program. The district court order may not have ensured full
compliance with the statutory provision, but the relief ordered clearly
was judicially manageable.
2. Will Granting a Private Remedy Interfere with the Remedial
Scheme that Congress Expressly Enacted?
Granting a plaintiff a remedy not authorized by a statute may
occasionally interfere with the express remedial scheme that Congress
enacted. In such a case, a court should be very reluctant to grant the
remedy if it concludes the interference actually will occur. A court
should not simply presume from the fact that Congress has enacted a
comprehensive remedial scheme that any additional remedies are
inappropriate. A court should deny relief only if the interference is
obvious, or if Congress has expressly indicated that it does not want
additional remedies.
426. Id. at 519. The Court concluded: "Although some knowledge of the hospital industry might
be required to evaluate a State's findings with respect to the reasonableness of its rates, such an
inquiry is well within the competence of the Judiciary." Id. at 520.
427. 503 U.S. 347 (1992).
428. Id. at 359-60.
429. Id. at 353.
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Professors Stewart and Sunstein assert that a mix of public and
private enforcement is often the best means of enforcing federal
regulatory or entitlement programs.43 They find "largely unpersuasive"
the objection that judicial authorization of private enforcement might
upset legislative fine-tuning of remedies:
Statutory language is often so general or ambiguous that the
legislature could not confidently predict the specific kind of activity
against which enforcement action will be brought. The fine-tuning
argument is even less convincing when, as is common, an agency
has a lump-sum budget to cover enforcement of numerous
provisions. Moreover, statutes often give agencies considerable
discretion in selecting among alternative sanctions and penalty
levels. These considerations severely weaken the argument that the
legislature anticipates and controls enforcement levels in a way that
would be undermined by judicial creation of private rights of
action.431
Consequently, a court should not assume that additional remedies are
inappropriate simply because a remedial scheme is comprehensive or
already includes some private remedies. As Stewart and Sunstein point
out, refusing to grant an additional private remedy in such circumstances
begs the question by assuming that congressional silence reflects an
intention to foreclose judicial creation of such rights. It is equally
plausible that sanctions and appropriations have been tailored in
contemplation of possible private enforcement. Congress may wish
to take advantage of the courts' ability to draw upon experience
with implementation of a particular regulatory program and to
judge the impact and desirability of private rights of action.432
Thus, a court should deny relief only if the defendant can demonstrate
that the private remedy plaintiff seeks would actually undermine or work
at cross purposes with the remedies Congress has authorized.
This analysis suggests that the Court was wrong in Middlesex County
Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass 'n433 to deny sum-
marily a private remedy under federal environmental statutes to fisher-
430. Stewart & Sunstein, supra note 6, at 1202. Although they recognize that there is some
danger private actions may usurp an agency's responsibility for regulatory implementation, id. at
1206-07, they also state private actions can be a useful supplement to public enforcement, which is
often inadequate because of budget restraints. Id. at 1214.
431. Id. at 1290 (footnotes omitted).
432. Id. at 1291 (footnotes omitted).
433. 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
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men injured by the dumping of sludge and sewage into the ocean off the
New York and New Jersey coasts. The Court denied relief simply
because the statutes contained "elaborate enforcement provisions"
without even considering whether the remedy the plaintiff sought would
interfere with the statutory enforcement scheme or otherwise undermine
legislative intent.434 The Court also was wrong in Massachusetts Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Russell43 in refusing to authorize a private remedy
for extra-contractual damages on behalf of a beneficiary of an employee
benefit plan against a fiduciary of the plan without considering whether
the remedy would undermine or be inconsistent with other remedies
allowed by the plan. The Court wrongly presumed from ERISA's
"interlocking, interrelated, and interdependent remedial scheme" 36 that
Congress did not intend any additional remedies without pointing to any
express statements to support that conclusion.437
In Smith v. Robinson,438 by contrast, the Court appeared to apply the
correct standards in deciding that a private remedy would actually
interfere with express statutory remedies. Plaintiff, a child suffering from
cerebral palsy and a variety of physical and emotional handicaps,
brought suit charging that a Rhode Island school district had denied him
the right to a free, appropriate public education.439 He claimed a denial of
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment and
§ 1983, and a violation of the Education of the Handicapped Act
(EHA{ ' The plaintiff eventually won on the merits and claimed
attorneys fees." Fees were recoverable on the § 1983 claim, but not
under the Act."2 Whether plaintiff was entitled to fees thus depended on
whether the § 1983 claim was viable or had been supplanted by the Act.
The Court concluded that both the provisions of the statute and the
434. Id. at 14-15. The Court in a footnote claimed that the Senate Reports on the two statutes
emphasized the limited nature of the citizen suits authorized, although it did not explain what the
limitations were. Id. at 17 n.27. It also quoted from the remarks ofa single legislator during debates
on another statute, the Clean Air Act, to the effect that a private damage remedy was not authorized
by that statute. Id. Because the citizen-suit provision of one of the statutes was modeled on the
parallel provision of the Clean Air Act, the Court concluded that Congress would not have approved
the fishermen's suit for damages. Id. These fragmentary references do not amount to a serious and
thorough consideration of whether the plaintiffs' lawsuit would have interfered with the statutory
enforcement scheme or undermined legislative intent. Id.
435. 473 U.S. 134 (1985).
436. Id. at 146.
437. Id. at 146-48.
438. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
439. Id. at 995.
440. Id at 994.
441. Id. at 998.
442. Id. at 1002.
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legislative history "indicate that Congress intended handicapped children
with constitutional claims to a free appropriate public education to
pursue those claims through the carefully tailored administrative and
judicial mechanism set out in the statute." 3 In reaching this conclusion,
the Court appeared to consider whether independent § 1983 claims
would actually interfere with these mechanisms. The Court stated that
allowing § 1983 claims would "render superfluous most of the detailed
procedural protections outlined in the statute." 4" Moreover, "it would
also run counter to Congress' view that the needs of handicapped
children are best accommodated by having the parents and the local
education agency work together to formulate an individualized plan for
each handicapped child's education." 5 Finally, the Court stated that
"[a]llowing a plaintiff to circumvent the EHA administrative remedies
would be inconsistent with Congress' carefully tailored scheme." 6
Thus, in Smith the Court appeared to assess the actual negative impact of
an unauthorized private remedy on the Act's remedial mechanism, rather
than merely assuming from the existence of a comprehensive remedial
scheme that no additional private remedies should be allowed.
The Court also was wrong in Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington4" and
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis"8 to deny private
remedies simply because Congress provided private remedies under
other sections of the statute involved in each case. In Touche Ross, the
Court refused to allow a private damage remedy under § 17(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 against an accounting firm that
conducted an allegedly improper audit and certification of a broker-
dealer's financial statement." 9 The Court noted that several nearby
sections of the Act created private rights of action and concluded from
this that Congress did not want a private remedy under § 17(a):
"Obviously, then, when Congress wished to provide a private damage
remedy, it knew how to do so and did so expressly.""45 The Court drew a
similar inference in Transamerica. It refused to allow a private remedy
under § 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 against the
investment advisers of a trust charged with fraud and breach of fiduciary
duty because other sections of the Act expressly authorized private
443. Id. at 1009.
444. Id. at 1011.
445. Id. at 1012.
446. Id. (emphasis added).
447. 442 U.S. 560 (1979).
448. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
449. Touche Ross, 442 U.S. at 579.
450. Id. at 571-72.
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remedies while § 206 did not.4 ' In both cases, the Court should instead
have asked whether allowing a damage remedy would have interfered
with other enforcement provisions, or whether there were any statements
in the legislative history showing that Congress did not want a private
remedy under the sections of the acts on which plaintiffs relied.
The Court has followed the correct approach in other cases. For
example, in Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Insurance of
Wausau, s2 the Court considered whether allowing a right of contribution
from joint tortfeasors in a lOb-5 action would "conflict with Congress'
own express rights of action.'" s The Court noted that §§ 9 and 18 of the
Securities Exchange Act, which are close in structure and purpose to
§ 10(b), both expressly provide for a right of contribution.4' Instead of
inferring from the existence of these other private remedies that it should
not create a contribution remedy under § 10(b), the Court concluded that
it should. s5 The Court also considered whether the contribution remedy
would "detract[l from the effectiveness of the lOb-5 implied action or
interfered with the effective operation of the securities laws," and
concluded that it would not.456 Similarly, in Cannon v. University of
Chicago,47 the Court stated: "The fact that other provisions of a complex
statutory scheme create express remedies has not been accepted as a
sufficient reason for refusing to imply an otherwise appropriate remedy
under a separate section."45" Instead, the Court required some "other,
more convincing, evidence that Congress meant to exclude the
remedy. '
45 9
In sum, a court should not assume additional remedies are inappro-
priate simply because Congress has enacted a comprehensive remedial
scheme or has included some private remedies in a statute. If the other
factors courts consider point in favor of authorizing the remedy plaintiff
seeks, the court should grant it unless it would interfere with the statute's
express remedial scheme or Congress has expressly ruled out the
remedy.
451. Transamerica, 444 U.S. at 19-20.
452 508 U.S. 286 (1993).
453. Id. at 295.
454. Id. at 295-97.
455. Id at 297.
456. Id. at 298.
457. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
458. Id. at 711.
459. Id.
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3. Will Allowing the Plaintiff To Proceed Result in a Flood of New
Lawsuits?
A court may properly consider whether authorizing a remedy for the
plaintiff will inundate the courts with lawsuits from other people
similarly situated. In a time when federal judicial resources are stretched
thin, the federal courts must not take on more cases than they can
competently adjudicate. Many times in our history the U.S. Supreme
Court has adopted rules to help keep caseloads manageable. For
example, following the 1875 grant of general civil federal question
jurisdiction to the lower federal courts," the U.S. Supreme Court
adopted the rule that a federal question must appear on the face of the
plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint, thus greatly restricting the number of
cases that could be brought in federal court.46' Similarly, the traditional
equitable doctrine that a federal court will not intervene in a pending
state criminal proceeding was given new life in Younger v. Harris462 by a
Court presumably fearful that the federal courts were about to be
engulfed by thousands of lawsuits from state criminal defendants
alleging constitutional violations in their state proceedings.463 In addition,
the decisions of the Burger Court restricting the availability of federal
habeas corpus responded to the dramatic increase in habeas corpus
filings in the late 1960s and early 1970s.' And indeed, the Court has
acknowledged that the "increased complexity of federal legislation and
the increased volume of federal litigation" prompted the adoption of the
strict new standards for implying private rights of action in the late 1970s
and early 1980s."6
While caseload is a legitimate concern, the world is increasingly
busy, and the federal courts have become more efficient and have
460. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994)).
461. For a discussion of the cases adopting this rule, see Doemberg, supra note 229, at 611-18.
462. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
463. See Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 123-24 (1951) (asserting that allowing state
defendants to come to federal court to raise constitutional challenges to procedures followed in their
pending state criminal cases "would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts
by resort to the federal forum"); see generally Donald H. Zeigler, Federal Court Reform of State
Criminal Justice Systems: A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine from a Modern Perspective, 19
U.C. DAViS L. REV. 31, 92-98 (1985) (discussing whether flood of litigation actually would occur if
Younger doctrine were abandoned).
464. See Donald H. Zeigler & Michele G. Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro
Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 169-73 (1972) (presenting statistics
demonstrating great increase in habeas petitions).
465. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 377 (1982).
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adopted substantial reforms to enable them to keep pace with increasing
caseloads.' Finally, as Justice Harlan once said:
Judicial resources, I am well aware, are increasingly scarce these
days. Nonetheless, when we automatically close the courthouse
door solely on this basis, we implicitly express a value judgment on
the comparative importance of classes of legally protected interests.
And current limitations upon the effective functioning of courts
arising from budgetary inadequacies should not be permitted to
stand in the way of the recognition of otherwise sound
constitutional principles.' 7
Justice Harlan's remarks may sound quaint today, but the maxim "where
there is a right, there is a remedy" should still have enough force that
courts will not deny remedies unless the practical consequences of
granting a remedy would seriously hamper their ability to function.
CONCLUSION
In Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers
Ass'n,468 Justice Stevens stated: "When should a person injured by a
violation of federal law be allowed to recover his damages in a federal
court? This seemingly simple question has recently presented the Court
with more difficulty than most substantive questions that come before
us." 9 This Article suggests that the Court caused much of the difficulty
itself by separating rights, rights of action, and remedies, and talking
about them as though they were independent of one another. Cases
asking whether a statute confers a right, implies a right of action, or
authorizes a remedy all involve the same basic question: Does the
applicable statutory provision entitle a plaintiff to the particular judicial
remedy he or she seeks? This Article has proposed a single, integrated
test to answer this question. If the Court were to follow this standard, it
would take the first step in putting its rights-remedies jurisprudence in
order.
466. See Zeigler, supra note 463, at 69-76; see also RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CHALLENGE AND REFORM (1996) (describing federal court efforts to keep pace with increasing
caseloads); Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of
Article III, 113 HARV. L. REV. 924 (2000) (describing and critiquing rise of managerial judging).
467. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
468. 453 U.S. I (1981).
469. Id. at 22-23 (Stevens, J., joined by Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in
part).
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